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In June 2012, the worldwide cyber security landscape changed when the 
presence of a new and sophisticated malware, later dubbed “Stuxnet,” was 
discovered in the computers of an Iranian nuclear facility. The malware was a 
cyber weapon, programmed to destroy the industrial machinery utilized for 
uranium enrichment. Stuxnet was soon dissected and diagnosed as a pioneering 
and politically motivated cyber attack that successfully infiltrated a high-security, 
government-run critical infrastructure and destroyed its physical property with 
computer code. The potential consequences of a similar attack on vulnerable 
U.S. critical infrastructures could be devastating.  
This thesis begins with a review of the evolution of U.S. policy related to 
the cyber defense of critical infrastructures. It then examines the critical 
infrastructure sectors within the United States, its dependency on computer 
technology, and the potential consequences of cyber attacks. A detailed case 
study of the Stuxnet attack follows, along with an analysis of the lessons learned 
from Stuxnet.  
The thesis concludes with specific policy improvement recommendations 
for the United States under three major themes: enhancing national unity of 
effort, expansion of cyber security coordination between the private and 
government sectors, and incentivizing private-sector compliance with best 
practices in cyber security. 
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Cyber security for critical infrastructures (CIs) ranks among the highest 
U.S. national security priorities. The national well-being and the fabric of 
American’s daily lives rely upon the security and resiliency of CIs. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) refers to (CI) as the, “backbone of our 
nation’s economy, security and health.”1 While Americans may not think about it, 
they unknowingly interact with CI in their daily lives through the electricity used 
and the clean water consumed. Computerized CIs also affect everyone’s daily 
lives by managing the transportation systems used for personal or business 
travel and the communications systems utilized to stay connected with friends, 
family, and coworkers.2 Interruptions to these or other critical services, such as 
delivering public safety and national defense, could be disruptive or devastating 
for this nation’s well-being and security. The CI systems and facilities that provide 
these foundational services have become increasingly computer reliant and 
networked. Computerized components, called industrial control systems (ICS), 
measure and control many of the industrial or mechanical processes needed to 
produce the desired outputs of U.S. CIs.  
This thesis identifies the pivotal areas of U.S. CI cyber security policy that 
could be enhanced to provide the most effective overarching solutions to the 
current vulnerabilities highlighted by the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s Natanz Uranium 
enrichment facility. The Stuxnet attack is the first publicly known use of a cyber-
weapon to destroy the CI of another country, accomplishing with computer 
programming, what only used to be possible through bombing or traditional 
sabotage.3 It provides a blueprint for how to conduct a specifically targeted cyber 
                                            
1 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?,” last modified October 24, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/what-
critical-infrastructure.  
2 Ibid. 
3 David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” New York 
Times, May 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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attack on the computer systems of a high security government controlled CI 
target.4 More specifically, it shows potential cyber adversaries how to inject 
malicious code into real time ICS controllers.5  
Three crucial points of failure contributed to the vulnerability that allowed 
Stuxnet to infiltrate, thrive within, and destroy centrifuges at Natanz. The first 
point of failure at Natanz, leading to the Stuxnet infection, was the insider threat 
of system access at the facility. Stuxnet was engineered to be hand carried into 
the Natanz plant to infect the computer network. The second point of failure at 
Natanz was the successful spread of Stuxnet through the air-gapped network to 
the programmable logic controllers (PLC), which controlled the precise spinning 
speed needed for proper centrifuge operations. These first two points of failure 
fall underneath the third point of failure, which was a deficiency in cyber security 
policy. Although the Iranian government will not publicly share its Natanz policy 
portfolio, a deficiency occurred in either establishing or following appropriate 
security protocols that led to the system access and system security breakdowns 
noted as the first two points of failure.  
Three key areas where policy enhancement could bolster U.S. national CI 
and ICS defenses have been identified as: enhancing national unity of effort, 
expansion of the coordination of effort between the private and government 
sectors, and incentivizing private sector compliance with best practices in cyber 
security.  
Three corresponding policy recommendations derived from these key 
areas for enhancement include: 
• The creation of a new federal Department of Cyber Affairs, led by a 
presidential cabinet level Secretary of Cyber Affairs, and the 
                                            
4 Stamatis Karnouskos, “Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System 
Security,” paper presented at the 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics 
Society (IECON 2011), Melbourne, Australia, November 7–10, 2011, http://papers.duckdns. 
org/files/2011_IECON_stuxnet.pdf. 
5 Ralph Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” The Langer Group, November 2013, 19, http://www. 
langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf. 
 xvii 
subsequent assignment to the department of developing a unified 
cyber security policy for the United States.  
• The consolidation of U.S. government cyber security expertise and 
assets for a more focused approach toward unified cyber defense 
for U.S. CIs. 
• The development of a voluntary business cyber security 
certification program that allows businesses exhibiting cyber 
security best practices to be recognized in the marketplace for their 
commitment by customers, investors and partners similar to the 
United Kingdom’s (U.K.’s) “Cyber Essentials” program.  
These recommendations would most effectively be implemented together 
as programs managed under a new federal Department of Cyber Affairs. The 
second two recommendations could also potentially be implemented 
independently and managed by separate government entities, which could be 
assigned responsibility for the separate recommendations. The disadvantage to 
that approach would be the continued fragmentation of cyber security 
responsibility among stakeholders within the United States when unity of effort 
should be the key to this diverse landscape of military, government, business and 
private sectors owners of U.S. CI.  
 xviii 
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U.S. critical infrastructure (CI) facilities rely on computer hardware and 
software systems to control and monitor their industrial processes.1 These 
computer systems are referred to as industrial control systems (ICS). The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines ICS as 
“combinations of control components that act together to achieve an industrial 
objective.”2 NIST further relates that ICS are “critical to the operation of U.S. CIs” 
and regulate the industrial processes commonly found in the “electrical, water 
and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation, pharmaceutical, 
pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., 
automotive, aerospace, and durable goods) industries.”3 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Early deployments of ICS in this country were initially viewed as being 
vulnerable to only local threats because their components were often part of 
stand-alone systems not connected to networks. Primary threats were thwarted 
with physical barriers for equipment and focused on screening personnel with 
access to the system. The threat landscape has drastically changed with modern 
networking trends toward integrating CI ICS with company information 
technology (IT) and wireless networks.4  
Threats to this nation’s CIs can come from a variety of sources to include 
hostile governments, terrorist groups, industrial spies, organized crime groups, 
                                            
1 Paul K. Kerr, John Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: 
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability (CRS Report No. R41524) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41524.pdf. 
2 Keith Stouffer et al., Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security (NIST-800-82) 





computer hackers, disgruntled employees, and malicious intruders.5 A crippling 
malware attack to CI, in almost any of the above noted sectors, could be 
economically devastating and could even lead to the loss of lives. Disruptions in 
service could affect this country’s government’s ability to provide basic domestic 
or international security services, create gaps in essential public sector services 
for lengthy periods of time, and foster a loss of public confidence in government.6 
Vulnerabilities in CI ICS, and their computer networks, have been 
highlighted by the 2010 discovery of the Stuxnet worm. The sophisticated 
malware attack carries serious implications for ICS common in CIs throughout 
the world and in the United States.7 Stuxnet is the first publicly recognized 
example of a cyber-weapon being used to attack and destroy industrial 
machinery.8 The Stuxnet worm was unprecedented because it was programmed 
to penetrate and attack ICS specifically, used by CI facilities, and cause long-
term damage or destruction to them.9 The Stuxnet code is currently available in 
the public domain of the Internet for tailoring and target customization.10 
The technical vulnerabilities of CI computer systems have been a topic of 
increasing concern for government, technology and computer security experts. 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the pivotal areas of U.S. CI cyber 
protection policy that could be enhanced to provide the most effective 
overarching solutions to the current vulnerabilities highlighted by the Stuxnet 
attack on Iran, and provide subsequent recommendations for policy 
                                            
5 “Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team,” accessed February 13, 
2015, https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/content/cyber-threat-source-descriptions. 
6 Kerr, Rollins, and Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm, 7. 
7 Stamatis Karnouskos, “Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System 
Security,” paper presented at the 37th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics 
Society (IECON 2011), Melbourne, Australia, November 7–10, 2011, 4490–4494, http://papers. 
duckdns.org/files/2011_IECON_stuxnet.pdf.  
8 Jim Finkle, “Researchers Say Stuxnet Was Deployed against Iran in 2007,” Reuters, 
February 26, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-cyberwar-stuxnet-idUSBRE 
91P0PP20130226. 
9 Kerr, Rollins, and Theohary, The Stuxnet Computer Worm, 6. 
10 Karnouskos, Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security, 4490–
4494. 
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advancements. To arrive at these recommendations, this thesis examines the 
Stuxnet attack, the vulnerabilities it exploited, and the lessons that may be taken 
away and applied to U.S. CIs. This thesis does not enter into the political debate 
or speculation attributing responsibility for launching this attack. 
This thesis provides a unique opportunity to study the use of a cyber 
weapon to target CI, in an unclassified environment, for the benefit of homeland 
security professionals from all disciplines. Most such attacks are classified and 
shrouded in secrecy to the point that little information is publicly available. Once 
current U.S. cyber defense policy for CIs is evaluated, and Stuxnet attack 
specifics are paired with a foundational understanding of the computerized 
components within CIs, policy recommendations may be drawn for strengthening 
overall cyber defense of U.S. CIs.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The cyber landscape changed when the presence of a new and 
sophisticated malware, later dubbed Stuxnet, was found in the computers of an 
Iranian nuclear facility. The code was programmed to control and destroy 
discreetly the centrifuge components of the Natanz uranium enrichment plant.11 
The Stuxnet worm became the first publicly known use of a cyber-weapon to 
destroy the CI of another country, accomplishing with computer programming, 
what only used to be possible through bombing or traditional sabotage.12  
1. Primary Research Question 
What are the policy ramifications that may be drawn from the Stuxnet 
attack, for industrialized nations, such as the United States that make extensive 
use of computerized industrial control systems within its CIs? 
                                            
11 Joby Warrick, “Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet 
Cyberattack,” Washington Post, February 16, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/15/AR2011021505395.html. 
12 Ellen Nakashima, “Stuxnet Malware Is Blueprint for Computer Attacks on U.S.,” 
Washington Post, October 2, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/10/01/AR2010100106981.html?sid=ST2010112903583. 
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2. Ancillary Research Question 
What vulnerabilities were exploited within the closed system, high security, 
CI environment of the Natanz nuclear facility during the Stuxnet attack? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Exploratory Case Study 
The object of study is the deployment of the Stuxnet malware as an 
offensive cyber weapon against Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. Stuxnet was the 
first high profile politically motivated cyber attack13 that caused significant 
physical damage to a CI facility.14 The research method design of this thesis 
project is that of an exploratory case study of the deployment of the Stuxnet 
malware. At the forefront of this study is an analysis of U.S. policy evolution 
pertaining CIs and cyber security, a detailed look at the 16 U.S. CI sectors, an 
examination of the reliance of CIs on computer technology, and an exploration of 
the vulnerability and potential consequences of cyber attacks on U.S. CIs. 
2. Why Stuxnet was Chosen 
The Stuxnet attack provides an outline for how to conduct a specifically 
targeted cyber-warfare attack on the computer systems of a state run CI target.15 
The Stuxnet worm was chosen because it is the first publicly known use of a 
cyber weapon to destroy the CI of another country. Stuxnet effectively 
accomplished, with computer malware deployment, what traditionally was only 
possible through bombing or traditional sabotage.16 Stuxnet presents a unique 
                                            
13 David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, February 1, 2013, http:// 
spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 
14 Steve Kroft, “Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare,” CBS News, June 1, 
2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare-04-06-
2012/. 
15 Karnouskos, “Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security.”  
16 David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” The New 
York Times, May 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-
ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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opportunity for study because it is relevant to CI cyber vulnerability in the U.S. 
today and has a great deal of unclassified information available on the topic.  
3. Limitations 
The purpose of this paper is not to distill the speculative writing as to 
whom or which government was actually responsible for the deployment of 
Stuxnet. This study focuses on the functional deployment of Stuxnet, the 
vulnerabilities it exploited, its effects on a high security CI, and policy 
recommendations for U.S. CIs. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The literature reviewed for this thesis, centered around the Stuxnet attack 
on Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility, is very diverse. It includes national 
policies from several countries, CI specific information, technical information 
concerning ICS, documents detailing the Stuxnet attack itself and an array of 
documents and literature contemplating the ramifications of the Stuxnet attack. A 
wide net must be cast to capture the background information needed to 
understand fully what this attack means to U.S. CIs and national policy. A wide 
variety of literary sources have been incorporated into this project to include 
books, technical publications, scholarly journal articles, published scholarly 
research papers, media reports, studies sponsored by organizations and Internet 
publications. The literature was assessed and then categorized by content type, 
although many sources contain information that fits neatly into multiple 
categories.  
This research topic is important for three reasons. First, the Stuxnet attack 
allows for a rare case study into a verifiable cyber attack on a government 
controlled CI. Literature available is on this attack in the non-classified realm, 
which might not be the case for most such attacks. Second, Stuxnet specifically 
targeted the ICS of the Natanz facility. Many U.S. CI sectors rely heavily on ICS. 
 6 
Finally, parallels can be drawn between the Stuxnet attack in Iran and U.S. CI 
vulnerability. Examining these parallels will lead to policy recommendations for 
strengthening the U.S. posture as it pertains to the cyber protection of national 
CIs.  
Two important definitions are key to understanding the concepts related to 
this subject matter.  
• Critical Infrastructure (CI)—The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) defines CIs as, “The assets, systems, and networks, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their 
incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on 
security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof.”17 
• Industrial Control System (ICS)—”Combinations of control 
components that act together to achieve an industrial objective.”18 
Overall, the literature on CIs and ICS is a mature array of documents with 
useful sources dating as far back as 1996. However, the literature on the Stuxnet 
attack itself is a different story. This attack was uncovered within the past five 
years; thus, the literature is relatively recent, with new material still being actively 
produced. Multiple relevant sources from 2014 and 2015 were found and utilized 
during research for this thesis, which sets the literature lifespan for the materials 
reviewed for this thesis at the past 20 years.  
The pertinent literature is organized into the following five categories: 
• Policy documents 
• U.S. CIs 
• Industrial control systems 
• Stuxnet attack 
• Future ramifications of Stuxnet 
                                            
17 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?,” last modified October 24, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/what-
critical-infrastructure.  
18 Stouffer et al., Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security, 17. 
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2. Policy Documents 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the pivotal areas of U.S. CI cyber 
protection policy that could be enhanced to provide the most effective solutions 
to the current vulnerabilities highlighted by the Stuxnet attack on Iran, and 
provide corresponding recommendations to improve U.S. policy. A review of U.S. 
national policy documents is a prerequisite for being able to recommend policy 
improvements. Large collections of pertinent documents were reviewed to 
include legislation, commission reports, presidential decision directives, 
executive orders and official federal plans.  
Executive Order (EO) 13010, signed by President Clinton on July 5, 1996, 
may be viewed as a starting point for U.S. CI protection. CI was defined and the 
initial CI sectors were identified. On May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, which focused on the subject of “CI 
protection.”19 This directive identified CI as a growing vulnerability and assigned 
each CI sector primary federal agency responsibility. 
President George W. Bush published two key executive orders, during the 
post-September 11th era, relevant to CI protection. EO 13228, signed by 
President Bush October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security 
and the Homeland Security Council.20 Eight days later, on October 18, 2001, he 
signed EO 13231. This document, entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the 
Information Age,” profoundly shifts the federal focus toward cyber threats.  
In October 2012, President Obama authorized Presidential Policy 
Directive 20, which defined U.S. cyber operations policy.21 The directive was 
issued as a classified document with a public fact sheet, but was later leaked and 
interpreted in a newspaper article by national security reporter Ellen Nakashima, 
                                            
19 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential 
Decision Directive 63, Washington, DC: The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1998, 1. 
20 Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 FR 51812 (2001-03), 1. 
21 Catherine A. Theohary and Anne I. Harrington, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and 
Plans: Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R43848) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2015), 18, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43848.pdf. 
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of the Washington Post.22 President Obama issued EO 13636, in February 2013, 
which was entitled “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”23 This order 
identifies repeated cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure as a growing threat 
that must be confronted.  
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD 21), “Critical Infrastructure Security 
and Resilience,” accompanied the release of EO 13636 in February 2013. PPD 
21, “Establishes national policy on critical infrastructure security and 
resilience.”24 PPD 21 also required an update to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP). The resulting work product was the NIPP 2013.  
EO 13636 called for, “the development of a voluntary risk based 
Cybersecurity Framework.”25 The objective of the framework was to 
collaboratively develop a, “set of industry standards and best practices to help 
organizations manage cybersecurity risks.”26 The NIST published the resulting 
framework in February 2014.27  
Comparisons must be drawn with the CI cyber security policy strategies of 
other nations to gauge the effectiveness of U.S. policies. The Australian 
government published complimentary documents in back to back years to focus 
on private and government sector stakeholders within this mission space. In 
2009, Attorney General Robert McClelland published the Australian national 
“cyber security strategy” to synergize efforts on national objectives to protect the 
                                            
22 Ellen Nakashima, “Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help Thwart Cyberattacks,” 
Washington Post, November 14, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/obama-signs-secret-cybersecurity-directive-allowing-more-aggressive-military-
role/2012/11/14/7bf51512-2cde-11e2-9ac2-1c61452669c3_story.html. 
23 Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 FR 11739 (2013), 1.  
24 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, Presidential Decision Directive 21, Washington, DC: The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, 2013, 2. 
25 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cyber Security (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2014), 1.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
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Australian government, and business and civilian sectors from cyber threats. The 
document also specifically addresses ICS security28 and CI cyber protection.29 In 
2010, he published the complimentary Australian national “critical infrastructure 
resilience strategy,” detailing an all hazards approach to national CI resiliency 
with an emphasis on cyber threats. These two policy documents outline 
overarching frameworks Australians can use to understand the objectives, 
strategic priorities, and components of their national strategy.  
The United Kingdom (U.K.) published a comprehensive national policy 
document, outlining a five-year strategy, on November 25, 2011. The policy is 
entitled, “The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a 
Digital World,” and notes that the U.K.’s national security strategy includes 
cybersecurity as one of its top tier national priorities. The strategy requires 
annual progress report updates at the end of each year that measure progress 
toward published program objectives. The United Kingdom also implemented a 
voluntary “cyber essentials” program in 2014 to reward cyber security best 
practices among private sector businesses. This government backed and 
industry supported program incentivizes widespread adoption of cyber security 
best practices that protect organizations against cyber attacks and gives them 
the ability to differentiate themselves in the marketplace for customers, investors, 
and business partners.  
3. U.S. Critical Infrastructures 
This thesis dissects the Stuxnet attack to derive policy recommendations 
to improve the cyber resilience of U.S. CIs. Therefore, a base of knowledge must 
be constructed concerning U.S. CIs. A review of the pertinent literature turned up 
several different types of sources, which are helpful in this regard. Useful 
materials ranging from PPD 21, to Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
                                            
28 Commonwealth of Australia, Cyber Security Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia: 
Attorney General’s Department, 2009), 13, https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/ 
CyberSecurity/Documents/AG%20Cyber%20Security%20Strategy%20-%20for%20website.pdf. 
29 Ibid., 20. 
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reports, to the websites sponsored by the DHS all cover different aspects of U.S. 
CIs. 
The key foundational document found on CIs in the United States is PPD 
21. This document was published on February 12, 2013, and is intended to 
establish national policy on CI security and resilience. The directive maps out the 
16 recognized U.S. CI sectors and establishes policy guidance for their 
protection. Although the document spends considerable space laying out federal 
obligations, it also emphasizes that the responsibility for protecting these assets 
is shared with state and local government agencies along with the owners and 
operators of privately owned facilities. This shared responsibility is a cornerstone 
concept for the policy recommendations that conclude this thesis.  
The CRS has published a number of reports on different aspects of this 
topic, which are outstanding sources of information. In January 2004, the CRS 
published a paper entitled Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the 
Terrorist Threat. Although this report might seem dated, it has strong historical 
context that documented CI vulnerability to cyber attacks over a decade ago. The 
report also ties this topic in to the original USA Patriot Act and sets the stage for 
the assertion that this vulnerability is not completely new.  
Another very topical CRS report was published in December of 2010 
entitled, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare 
Capability. This report is helpful in not only documenting concerns about U.S. 
CIs, but also connecting them to potential vulnerabilities a Stuxnet style attack 
could potentially exploit. As a bonus for other portions of the thesis, this report 
also contains specific information on the Stuxnet attack and its effects on Iran. 
The DHS has a website dedicated to publishing information for the 
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team. Their function is 
to provide a coordinated defense of national ICS against emerging cyber threats 
and to share information with public and private stakeholders. This website is full 
of topical advisories, alerts, newsletters, and reports that relate directly to this 
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thesis topic. In addition, the DHS maintains a web page portfolio analyzing each 
of the 16 CI sectors. These pages include detailed sector specific information 
that provides critical context to the differences in vulnerability between the 
various sectors.  
4. Industrial Control Systems 
ICS are a critical computerized component of many U.S. CIs. To 
understand the vulnerabilities present within these systems, it is necessary to 
have a foundational understanding of these systems and how they function within 
the CI environment. Much of the literature within this category is very technical 
and tends to be associated with professional or trade publications. 
Tarun Agarwal wrote several articles for “EDGEFX.US,” including an 
article entitled “A Glance on Industrial Control Systems with Control Strategies.” 
This article does a nice job breaking down a complex topic into easy to digest 
sections. One particularly useful section entitled “Types of Industrial Control 
Systems,” breaks these systems down into three categories and explains what 
these different systems control as it pertains to industrial processes.  
German researcher Stamatas Karnouskos published a paper entitled, 
“Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security.” This paper 
covers ICS and the vulnerabilities inherent within their environments. He notes a 
false sense of security that he believes is present with managers of these 
isolated network systems. Karnouskos also points to aging and poorly defended 
industrial infrastructures as an easy target for malware attacks.  
Gheorghe Boaru and George-Ionut Badita, of the Romanian National 
Defense University, authored a paper directly applicable to this thesis entitled, 
“Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control 
Systems.” This material directly applies to multiple sections of this thesis to 
include the role of ICS in electricity generation and distribution, the cyber 
vulnerabilities of current ICS, automated decision making by ICS, and the 
perceived logic behind private sector reluctance to upgrade or update their ICS. 
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A CRS report from Dana Shea entitled, Critical Infrastructure: Control 
Systems and the Terrorist Threat, provides foundational information on how ICS 
function and fit into CIs. The information is presented in a manner easily 
understood by readers who may not come from a technical or engineering 
background. Morgan Henrie wrote an article entitled “Cyber Security Risk 
Management in the SCADA Critical Infrastructure Environment,” for the 
Engineering Management Journal. This article provides detailed information on 
how SCADA systems remotely monitor multiple field sites and take autonomous 
action during industrial processes.  
The NIST published a definitive report in May 2014 entitled, Guide to 
Industrial Control Systems Security (NIST Special Publication 800–802). It is a 
comprehensive report, directly related to this thesis topic, which is a key building 
block for this thesis. The report provides an operational overview of the functions 
and types of ICS, a section on ICS risk management, a section on ICS security 
architecture and other important information, such as an acronym appendix for 
this technical subject matter. 
5. The Stuxnet Attack  
The Stuxnet attack was not discovered until 2010; therefore, the literature 
on the attack itself is still being written. The author found some of the best 
information on the Stuxnet attack in technology industry publications and news 
sources. Some of those news stories in turn began to emerge as books, such as 
David Sanger’s, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising 
Use of American Power. Although this book contains good information about the 
Stuxnet attack, a researcher must realize that this book has a political agenda 
behind it and scrutinize it for editorial content as opposed to factual content. 
Factual information can also be extracted from the newspaper articles Sanger 
authored prior to the release of this book.  
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) shares 
information in its online publication entitled Spectrum. In February 2013, IEEE 
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Spectrum published an article by David Kushner entitled, “The Real Story of 
Stuxnet.” This report is rich with a lot of factual information from an unbiased 
industry perspective. Kushner details the discovery, size, and scope of Stuxnet, 
along with the three phases with which it was deployed. The article also explains 
how the worm could be spread to systems not part of a network and identifies 
Chevron as the first U.S. corporation to admit that Stuxnet had infected it’s 
systems. The author also provides a useful “milestones in malware” timeline of 
significant malware events since 1971. Kushner also takes a look ahead at new 
malware threats and U.S. ICS vulnerability. 
The Washington Post published a series of investigative pieces on 
Stuxnet from 2010–2012. Several of these articles are directly applicable to this 
research. Ellen Nakashima’s article, “Stuxnet Malware is a Blueprint for 
Computer Attacks on U.S.” (October 2010), specifically covers how a similar 
attack could sabotage computer equipment critical to U.S. power plants, power 
grids, and other infrastructures. The article contains interviews and quotes about 
Stuxnet from both industry and government experts. Joby Warrick’s investigative 
piece, “Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility Recovered Quickly from Stuxnet 
Cyberattack” (February 2011), explains how United Nations (UN) inspectors had 
a front row seat to watch Stuxnet’s damage to Natanz through cameras that were 
in place to monitor the facility under a weapons monitoring program. Nakashima 
and Warrick combined forces in 2012 for follow up articles that expand on their 
earlier works. 
The author found additional research materials in investigative articles 
written and published by Reuters, Business Insider and The New York Times. 
David Sanger first started publishing his investigative pieces in The New York 
Times prior to publishing his book. His article, “Obama Sped Up Wave of 
Cyberattacks against Iran,” contains good information on the phases of the attack 
and the effects on Natanz. This article also lays out his theory for how Stuxnet 
spread from Natanz to the Internet. The articles from Reuters and Business 
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Insider are less comprehensive than the others but contain some pertinent 
technical details not found in other sources.  
Ralph Langer is a German ICS security expert who has achieved 
recognition for his analysis of Stuxnet. He published part of his analysis in a 
document entitled, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” which although it is very technical in 
spots, provides a detailed breakdown of the Stuxnet attack that is directly 
pertinent to this thesis. Langer details the three layers of ICS that must be 
interacted with to accomplish physical damage with a cyber attack. He also 
elaborates on the resources necessary to develop and implement a cyber attack 
of Stuxnet’s magnitude and covers the specific vulnerabilities the attack sought to 
exploit. 
Other technical documents, such as Symantec’s “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 
provide outstanding functionality details, such as how Stuxnet propagated itself, 
and outlines specific points of failure within Natanz that allowed Stuxnet to 
flourish in Iran. Jim E. Crouch and Larry K. McKee Jr., of the National Security 
Cyberspace Institute, published a report entitled, “Cybersecurity: What Have We 
Learned?” This report covers how specific policy approaches can be utilized to 
prevent attacks like Stuxnet. Doug Niblick’s “Protecting Critical Infrastructure 
against the Next Stuxnet” also covers policy and technical issues key to 
preventing CI cyber attacks. 
6. Future Ramifications of Stuxnet  
The last portion of this initial literature review deals with what Stuxnet 
means, moving forward, for U.S. CIs and the policies that affect them. Stuxnet 
casts a long shadow on this complex and interdependent network of vital assets. 
Many of the literary sources already detailed have sections that directly apply to 
this portion of this thesis as well.  
In June 2012, CBS News aired a feature 60 Minutes segment entitled, 
“Stuxnet: Computer Worm Opens New Era of Warfare.” This comprehensive 
investigative report covered the basics, such as the how Stuxnet was discovered, 
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and how it worked. However, it also took a predictive look at what Stuxnet 
foretells for the future of the United States through the eyes of key decision 
makers at that time, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director 
Robert Mueller, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, House Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Mike Rogers, and Retired General Mike Hayden. 
A number of news articles were located with information pertinent to the 
future ramifications of Stuxnet. Ellen Nakashima’s work with the Washington Post 
surfaces again with her piece entitled, “Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 
22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say.” It is another directly applicable 
article that can be used to show that the United States still has current 
unaddressed cyber vulnerabilities being actively exploited by adversaries. The 
Wall Street Journal published a pertinent article entitled, “Cyberwar Ignites New 
Arms Race,” which provides an overview of nations currently fielding either 
military- or intelligence-based cyber units to conduct operations in cyber space. It 
also details the current U.S. military posture pertaining to cyber units and reveals 
staffing plans for their expansion in the near future. News 24 published an article 
in May 2012 entitled, “Cyber Terror Targets Utilities.” This article covers 
everything from energy infrastructure vulnerability to theories about cyber attacks 
becoming a staple in modern warfare. More specifically, it contains opinions from 
industry experts who believe that energy and communications networks would be 
considered desirable targets to begin any modern day military attack.  
Catherine Theohary and Anne Harrington of the CRS authored a report 
entitled, Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for Congress, which 
focuses on the policy dilemmas U.S. decision makers will have to wrestle with in 
the near future. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published a 
report entitled, Critical Infrastructure Protection- Progress Coordinating 
Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. This 
insightful article provides statistical information pertinent to CI cyber vulnerability, 
what has been done, and where more progress is required. Amitai Etzioni, of the 
George Washington University, published an article entitled, “The Private Sector: 
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A Reluctant Partner in Cybersecurity.” This article clearly articulates the 
reasoning why some private sector CI stakeholders are slow to upgrade cyber 
security technology in their facilities. 
Research revealed two other topics with consequential future implications 
related to cyber security for CIs. The first topic concerns the ethical issues that 
arise from taking action in cyberspace. Dorothy Denning of the Naval 
Postgraduate School wrote a paper entitled, “Framework and Principles for 
Active Cyber Defense.” This paper focuses on covering the differences between 
active and passive cyber countermeasures and the ethical dilemmas than arise 
from taking action in cyberspace. An edited book with chapters from multiple 
authors entitled, “Warfare in a New Domain: Ethics of Military Cyber-Operations,” 
takes a deeper dive into these ethical issues from the perspectives of multiple 
authors. Although many of these chapters are militarily based, many parallels 
can be drawn with government and private sector CI cyber protection. 
The second topic of consequential implications for the future of cyber 
defense concerns the educational sector. The United States is struggling to 
educate and train sufficient numbers of cyber security professionals. Defense 
Horizons published an article entitled, “Preparing the Pipeline: The U.S. Cyber 
Workforce for the Future.” This article lays out the cornerstone educational fields 
where focus is needed to build a competent cyber security workforce and details 
difficulties currently found within the industry to meet staffing demands. 
Christophe Veltsos authored an article entitled, “Addressing the Information 
Security Skills Gap in Partnership with Academia,” for Security Intelligence in 
October 2015. Veltsos describes a gap in the U.S. cyber security workforce that 
results from U.S. educational institutions failing to train and educate cyber 
security professionals fast enough to meet the demand. He describes a 
professional environment in which private and public sectors employers are 
forced to raid cyber security talent from competitors or government agencies 
because not enough qualified professionals are available to meet national needs. 
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The Unisys Corporation partnered with the Ponemon Institute to conduct a 
survey of 599 executives in key industries, such as utilities, oil and gas, energy, 
and manufacturing. The survey questions probed the executives’ views of ICS 
vulnerability within their companies. This survey contains remarkable responses 
that highlight the wide scope of CI cyber vulnerability. The survey responses 
paint the portrait of a recognized problem not being appropriately prioritized for 
solutions. The CSIS Strategic Technologies Program published a noteworthy 
“Cyber Incident Timeline,” which chronicles significant cyber attacks, and aides in 
scoping the breadth of current CI vulnerabilities. 
The author’s literature research of U.S. policy, U.S. CIs, ICS, Stuxnet’s 
deployment, and future policy ramifications resulting from the Stuxnet attack, was 
a continual and evolving process. During this thesis project, a point was never 
reached when the research was considered to be “complete.” It is still an 
emergent topic and new sources and articles were found daily during the 
research process right up until the end of the project. This topic will continue to 
be fertile ground for further research into the foreseeable future.  
E. CONTRIBUTION TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
The technical vulnerabilities of CI computer systems have been a topic of 
increasing concern for government, technology, and computer security experts. 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the pivotal areas of U.S. CI cyber 
protection policy that could be enhanced to provide the most effective 
overarching solutions to the current vulnerabilities highlighted by the Stuxnet 
attack on Iran, and provide subsequent recommendations for U.S. policy 
advancements. This thesis provides a unique opportunity to study the use of a 
cyber weapon to target CI, in an unclassified environment, for the benefit of 
homeland security professionals from all disciplines.  
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II. U.S. POLICY
Government agencies have been concerned about CI security in the 
United States for decades. Those concerns range from physical threats, such as 
the September 11, 2001, airline hijackings that led to the death of thousands of 
Americans, and the destruction of the World Trade Center, to an increasing focus 
on cyber threats. Certain socioeconomic activities form the foundation of day-to-
day life and shape the overall security posture of this nation. Some of these 
activities include the transportation of goods and people, functioning 
communications networks, banking and finance, and the supply of basic 
necessities, such as electricity and water.30 Interruptions to the delivery of these 
services can have a disruptive effect on this nation’s well-being and psyche. The 
infrastructures required to deliver these services have grown to be increasingly 
complex, interconnected and reliant on networked computer systems. In a 
cascading effect, the disruption on one system may lead to the disruption of 
others.31  
A. CYBER ATTACKS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The 1990s, and the first decade of this century, saw a primary focus on 
three negative consequences of fast-growing web and networked computer 
technology. Those areas included cyber crime, espionage, and the theft of 
intellectual property.32 See Figure 1. However, ominous clouds were on the 
horizon signaling potential new threats. The National Security Agency (NSA) 
conducted an internal exercise that began in 1997 dubbed “Eligible Receiver.” 
The exercise exposed, for the first time, just how ill prepared the United States 
30 John D. Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation (CRS 
Report No. RL30153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 2, http://fas. 
org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL30153.pdf. 
31 Ibid., 1. 
32 Misha Glenny and Camino Kavanagh, “800 Titles but no Policy—Thoughts on Cyber 
Warfare,” American Foreign Policy Interests 34, no. 6 (2012): 287, http://search.proquest. 
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1264925856?accountid=12702. 
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was to protect computer networked CIs from cyber attacks.33 NSA hackers used 
publicly available material to infiltrate the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 
Pacific Command Center successfully, this nation’s electric grids and 9-1-1 
emergency communications systems in nine major cities.34 In 1998, the United 
States uncovered a cyber-probing program that had been accessing the 
computer networks of the Pentagon, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, the Department of Energy (DOE) and select university research 
labs. The two-year long campaign was traced back to a mainframe computer in 
the former Soviet Union.35 A series of malware worms, designed for espionage 
and surveillance, or CI targets, were discovered throughout 2003.36  
Figure 1.  Timeline of Significant Early Cyber Events 
Ethnic strife within Estonia, between ethnic Estonians and Russia 
nationals, led to social unrest and crippling distributed denial of service attack 
33 Glenny and Kavanagh, “800 Titles but no Policy—Thoughts on Cyber Warfare,” 287. 
34 Ibid., 288. 
35 Bob Drogin, “Russians Seem to be Hacking into Pentagon,” Los Angeles Times, October 
7, 1999, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Russians-Seem-To-Be-Hacking-Into-Pentagon-
2903309.php. 





























(DDoS), which affected the nation’s CI and government access to the Internet.37 
The U.S. and European allies debated whether the Estonian cyber attack was an 
act of cyber warfare or digital violence that required new countermeasures. The 
DDoS strike effectively halted public services, commerce, and government 
operations.38 Although it was widely believed that Russian hackers were 
responsible for the attacks, direct attribution to the Kremlin was not achieved.39 
That incident was followed up by a 2008 malware compromise of DOD computer 
networks by a “foreign intelligence agency.” The malware was implanted via an 
infected universal serial Bus (USB) memory stick and spread through the 
military’s unclassified network and classified networks prompting a response 
launched under the code name “Buckshot Yankee.” This wakeup call was the 
most serious historical compromise of U.S. military networks ever, at that time, 
and could have led to the delivery of battle plans into the hands of a foreign 
adversary.40 
Securing cyberspace, and the computer networked CIs which interact 
within it, has become a national policy priority for many governments, including 
the United States. For now, state actors and inter-state relationships rule within 
the cyber realm. However, the potential for terrorist groups to develop the 
capability or relationships necessary to target a nation’s government and private 
CIs remains a serious threat. Government and industry experts agree that once 
terrorists acquire the necessary skills and sophistication, they will use it.41  
                                            
37 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational 
Responses,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 50–51, http://scholarcomm 
ons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=jss. 
38 Ibid., 54. 
39 Ibid., 53. 
40 William J. Lynn III. “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign Affairs, accessed November 29, 
2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2010-09-01/defending-new-domain. 
41 Natalia Tereshchenko, “U.S. Foreign Policy Challenges of Non-State Actors’ Cyber 
Terrorism against Critical Infrastructure,” International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism 2, 
no. 4 (October 2012): 29, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1465900385?accountid=12702. 
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B. EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICY ON CYBER CI PROTECTION  
Defining U.S. policy as it pertains to CI cyber protection is made difficult 
due to the overlapping nature of the various documents, which make up the 
policy. The complex policy must be distilled from differing documents, such as 
legislation, commission reports, presidential decision directives, EOs and official 
federal plans. Changes in Presidential administrations bring a cycle of 
restructuring, realigning, renaming, and refocusing of efforts and objectives.  
The modern era of CI protection and cyber defense began under 
President William J. Clinton. EO 13010, signed by President Clinton on July 5, 
1996, may be viewed as a starting point for U.S. CI protection. CI was defined 
and the initial CI sectors were identified. The order established the “President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection” and set up the “Principals 
Committee” to review their recommendations prior to submission to the 
President.42 The Commission recommended greater cooperation and 
communication between the government and the private sector, and generally 
viewed information dissemination on intrusion techniques, threat analysis, and 
computer hacker defense, as its primary role.43 This theme of encouraging 
greater collaboration between the private and government sectors is a common 
anchor of all the policy documents reviewed during this research.  
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton signed PDD-63, which focused on the 
subject of “CI protection.”44 This directive identified CI as a growing vulnerability, 
assigned each CI sector primary federal agency responsibility, and required the 
creation of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would integrate 
protection plans from the CI sectors. A 180-day timeframe was set for the 
completion of the plan, related vulnerability analyses, and sector specific 
                                            
42 Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 FR 37347 (1996–99), 1. 
43 Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation, 3. 
44 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential 
Decision Directive 63, 1. 
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remedial plans.45 PDD-63 also displayed heightened cyber security awareness 
and compelled enhancements to U.S. proficiency in the diagnosis and timely 
countering of cyber attacks.46 The criticality of public and private partnerships 
again was identified as a key strategic component to reducing critical 
infrastructure vulnerability.47  
President George W. Bush published two key EOs during the post 
September-11 era that were relevant to CI protection. EO 13228, signed by 
President Bush on October 8, 2001, established the Office of Homeland Security 
and the Homeland Security Council.48 The Office of Homeland Security was 
required to develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy to secure 
the nation’s CIs from terrorist threats.49 The Homeland Security Council was set 
up to advise the President on all homeland security matters.50  
Eight days later, on October 18, 2001, President Bush signed EO 13231. 
This document, entitled “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age,” 
profoundly shifts the federal focus toward cyber threats. It recognizes that 
technology has transformed the way society functions and was published 
specifically to ensure protection of information systems for CI.51 The order also 
establishes the “President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board” to propose 
new guidelines and organize initiatives designed to safeguard the computer 
networks of U.S. CIs. The chairman of that board was designated to act as a 
Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security.52  
45 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential 
Decision Directive 63, 8. 
46 Moteff, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation, 6. 
47 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Presidential Decision Directive 63, 3. 
48 Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 FR 51812 (2001–03), 1. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Exec. Order No. 132231, 66 FR 53063 (2001), 1.  
52 Ibid., 4. 
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In January 2008, President Bush signed National Security Presidential 
Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 requiring a cyberspace 
policy review. President Obama subsequently took office in January 2009, 
identified cyber security as a national security threat, and directed that all 
computer infrastructures within the purview of the federal government be 
comprehensively reviewed.53 He later authorized the guidance published 
following the Bush initiated cyber space policy review, in May 2009. It included 
the establishment of an “Executive Branch Cybersecurity Coordinator,” who 
would have direct access to the president.54 
Although the initial directive was published as classified, the resulting 
“Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” (CNCI) document was not. 
President Obama viewed the CNCI as playing a key role in supporting his 
cybersecurity objectives.55 The report sought unity of effort in national 
cybersecurity efforts. The CNCI sets three major goals to help secure the United 
States in cyberspace. 
The first goal of the CNCI is, “to establish a front line of defense against 
today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness 
of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Government—
and ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector 
partners.”56 This unified front line of defense would have the shared, “ability to 
act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.”57 
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The second goal of the CNCI is, “to defend against the full spectrum of 
threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the 
security of the supply chain for key information technologies.”58 
The third goal of the CNCI is, “to strengthen the future cybersecurity 
environment by expanding cyber education; coordinating and redirecting 
research and development efforts across the Federal Government; and working 
to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in 
cyberspace.”59 
In October 2012, President Obama authorized PPD 20, which defined 
U.S. cyber operations policy.60 The directive was issued as a classified 
document with a public fact sheet, but was later leaked and revealed in a 
newspaper article by national security reporter Ellen Nakashima, of the 
Washington Post.61 Nakashima interviewed un-named senior administration 
officials, who were not authorized to speak on the record, about the document 
and its contents. According to Nakashima, PPD 20 establishes a framework of 
standards to guide the actions taken by federal agencies manning the battle lines 
of emerging cyber threats.62 The author characterizes the document by writing it, 
“attempts to settle years of debate among government agencies about who is 
authorized to take what sorts of actions in cyberspace and with what level of 
permission.”63 She continues by writing, “For the first time, the directive explicitly 
makes a distinction between network defense and cyber-operations to guide 
58 Executive Office of the President of the United States, The Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative, 1. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Theohary and Harrington. Cyber Operations in DOD Policy and Plans: Issues for 
Congress, 18. 




officials charged with making often-rapid decisions when confronted with 
threats.”64 
In part, the public White House fact sheet for PPD 20 notes that it 
“establishes principles and processes for the use of cyber operations to ensure 
our cyber tools are integrated with the full array of national security tools we have 
at our disposal.”65 The fact sheet adds that PPD 20, “provides a whole-of- 
government approach consistent with the values our nation that we promote 
domestically and internationally.”66 The PPD 20 fact sheet also establishes that it 
will be U.S. policy, “that we shall undertake the least action necessary to mitigate 
threats and that we will prioritize network defense and law enforcement as the 
preferred courses of action.”67  
President Obama issued EO 13636, in February 2013, which was entitled 
“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.”68 This order identifies repeated 
cyber intrusions into CI as a growing threat that must be confronted. EO 13636 
states, “it is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience 
of the nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that 
encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting 
safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties.”69  
This document focuses on the challenges presented by privately owned 
and operated CIs, and the need to share information with them. EO 13636 
stresses the importance of, “partnerships with the owners and operators of 
critical infrastructures to improve cybersecurity information sharing and 
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collaboratively develop and implement risk based standards.”70 It further 
identifies as a policy objective of the U.S. government to, “increase the volume, 
timeliness, and quality of cyber threat information shared with U.S. private sector 
entities,” so they may “better protect and defend themselves against cyber 
threats.”71  
The policy focus on productive information sharing is further supported in 
this document through direction to ensure the “dissemination of classified reports 
to critical infrastructure entities authorized to receive them,” and expediting “the 
processing of security clearances for appropriate personnel employed by critical 
infrastructure operators.”72 EO 13636 also calls for the expanded “use of 
programs that bring private sector subject matter experts into federal service on a 
temporary basis” to increase productive collaboration between the government 
and private sectors.73 
EO 13636 also called upon the Secretary of Commerce to task the 
director of NIST with developing a “cybersecurity framework,” to address cyber 
vulnerability within national CI. The framework was to include input from private 
sector stakeholders to encourage participatory compliance with collaboratively 
established cyber security best practices.74 The framework was directed to 
specifically provide for a, “flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-
effective approach, including information security measures and controls, to help 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure identify, assess and manage cyber 
risk.”75 The order also directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a 
“voluntary critical infrastructure cybersecurity program” to incentivize the 
70 Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 FR 11739 (2013), 2. 
71 Ibid. 
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utilization of the “cybersecurity framework” among private sector CI 
stakeholders.76 
PPD 21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” accompanied the 
release of EO 13636 in February 2013. PPD 21, “Establishes national policy on 
critical infrastructure security and resilience.”77 It also notes that this 
responsibility is, “shared among federal, state, local, tribal, territorial entities, and 
private owners of critical infrastructure.” The policy statement reads as follows: 
It is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and 
resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and 
cyber threats. The Federal Government shall work with critical 
infrastructure owners and operators and SLTT entities to take 
proactive steps to manage risk and strengthen the security and 
resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, considering all 
hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national security, 
economic stability, public health and safety, or any combination 
thereof. These efforts shall seek to reduce vulnerabilities, minimize 
consequences, identify and disrupt threats, and hasten response 
and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure.78 
PPD 21 promotes “three strategic imperatives” that govern U.S. strategy 
toward bolstering CI security and resilience.79 The first imperative forwarded 
within PPD 21 is to, “refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal 
Government to advance national unity of effort to strengthen critical infrastructure 
security and resilience.” The second imperative from PPD 21 is to, “enable 
effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and systems 
requirements for the Federal Government.” The final imperative of PPD 21 is to, 
“implement an integration and analysis function to guide planning and operational 
decisions regarding critical infrastructure.” 
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PPD 21 also required an update to the NIPP. The resulting work product 
was the NIPP 2013. This national plan embraces the collaborative process and 
was constructed with the active participation from the CI community and 
government representatives. The national plan focuses on “risk management” as 
the skeletal framework for CI “security and resilience” and encourages continued 
focus on stakeholder collaboration as a vital component of the risk management 
process.80 The intended audience for this national plan includes, “wide-ranging 
critical infrastructure community comprised of public and private critical 
infrastructure owners and operators; Federal departments and agencies, 
including Sector–Specific Agencies (SSAs); State, local, tribal and territorial 
(SLTT) governments; regional entities; and other private and non-profit 
organizations charged with securing and strengthening the resilience of critical 
infrastructure.”81 
The National Plan illustrates that mitigating CI vulnerability requires a 
unified strategy, joining the broad private and government sectors, to accomplish 
three key objectives.82 The first key objective of the National Plan is to, “identify, 
deter, detect, disrupt and prepare for threats and hazards to the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.” The second key objective is to, “reduce vulnerabilities of critical 
assets, systems and networks.” The final objective of the National Plan is to, 
“mitigate the potential consequences to critical infrastructure of incidents or 
adverse actions that do occur.” 
The National Plan designs a, “national unity of effort to achieve critical 
infrastructure security and resilience.”83 The core of the National Plan is the “call 
to action” section, which “guides efforts to achieve national goals aimed at 
enhancing national critical infrastructure security and resilience,” collaboratively 
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within the critical infrastructure community.84 The 12 specific calls to action are 
broken down into three categories. 
The first category within this call to action is, “Build upon Partnership 
Efforts,” and contains four specific calls to action.85 The first call to action for this 
category is to, “set a national focus through jointly developed priorities.” The 
second call to action in this category is to, “determine collective actions through 
joint planning efforts.” The third call to action for the category is to, “empower 
local and regional partnerships to build capacity nationally.” The final categorical 
call to action is to, “leverage incentives to advance security and resilience.”  
The second category within the call to action section is, “innovate in 
managing risk,” and contains six specific calls to action.86 The first call to action 
for this category is, “enable risk informed decision making through enhanced 
situational awareness.” The second call is, “analyze infrastructure dependencies, 
interdependencies and associated cascading effects.” The third call is, “identify, 
assess and respond to unanticipated infrastructure cascading effects during and 
following incidents.” The fourth call is to “promote infrastructure, community and 
regional recovery following incidents.” The fifth call is to “strengthen coordinated 
development and delivery of technical assistance, training and education.” The 
final call is to, “improve critical infrastructure security and resilience by advancing 
research and development solutions.” 
The third and final category is, “focus on outcomes,” and contains two 
specific calls to action.87 The first call to action for this category is to, “evaluate 
progress toward the achievement of goals.” The second call is to, “learn and 
adapt during and after exercises and incidents.”  
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C. NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 
EO 13636 required the implementation of a “voluntary and risk based” 
“Cybersecurity Framework.”88 The objective of the Framework was the 
collaborative development of, “a set of industry standards and best practices to 
help organizations manage cybersecurity risks.”89 NIST presented the resulting 
framework in February 2014.90 The report notes, “use of this voluntary 
framework is the next step to improve the cybersecurity of our nation’s critical 
infrastructure—providing guidance for individual organizations, while increasing 
the cybersecurity posture of the nation’s critical infrastructure as a whole.”91 The 
“Cybersecurity Framework” is composed of three parts. 
The framework core is the first part. It is a set of, “cybersecurity activities, 
desired outcomes, and applicable references that are common across critical 
infrastructure sectors.”92 This framework core is comprised of five primary 
functions: “identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.”93 The core facilitates 
the dissemination of cyber security information throughout organizations from 
senior executives all the way down to line level employees.94 It also provides 
basic steps an organization can take to facilitate working toward specific cyber 
security goals, which will assist its organization with mitigating cyber security 
vulnerabilities.95  
The framework implementation tiers, “provide context on how an 
organization handles cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to manage 
88 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical 
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that risk.”96 The tiers are used to specify the level at which an organization has 
adopted and implemented outlined cyber security vulnerability mitigation 
practices and their adherence to the standards defined within the “cybersecurity 
framework.” The designation process of tiers, “considers an organization’s 
current risk management practices, threat environment, legal and regulatory 
requirements, business/mission objectives, and organizational constraints.”97 
The tiers categorize an organization’s procedures through a continuum 
describing increasing sophistication of practices from partial (tier 1), to risk 
informed (tier 2), to repeatable (tier 3), to adaptive (tier 4).98  
The framework profile is characterized as the, “alignment of standards, 
guidelines, and practices to the framework core in a particular implementation 
scenario.”99 The profiles are designed to highlight cyber security weakness and 
improve cyber security preparedness, through the comparison of a current 
performance standard profile with a desired performance profile standard, to 
identify vulnerabilities for mitigation.100  
The Framework can be used as a tool to manage cybersecurity risk by 
identifying the key operational functions in need of attention and then prioritizing 
spending to address these deficiencies.101 The Framework is intended to 
complement, not replace, an organization’s existing cybersecurity program.102 
However, if an organization does not have a current program, the Framework 
can serve as the foundation for the development of a brand new cyber security 
program.103 Lastly, the Framework develops, “a common language to 
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communicate among interdependent stakeholders” who are responsible for 
protecting CI services.104 
U.S. CI cybersecurity policy has evolved greatly over the past two 
decades. The complex policy is an interwoven fabric containing a combination of 
varied types of national policy documents. The policy has evolved from an initial 
focus on physical security to an intense focus on cybersecurity. The policy has 
evolved from a baseline of definitions and sector identifications all the way to the 
National Cybersecurity Framework for CI Protection and the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan. Some of the policies are classified documents 
permitting cyber defenses that cannot be detailed, and other policies are open 
source documents crafted with the inclusion of the public sector in mind. One 
thing is clear, as technology evolves, so must this nation’s policies and focus on 
cyber security.  
104 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cyber Security, 15. 
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III. U.S. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ICS
U.S. national well-being and the fabric American’s daily lives rely upon the 
security and resiliency of U.S. CIs. The DHS refers to CI as the, “backbone of our 
nation’s economy, security and health.”105 Although it is most often taken for 
granted, CI unknowingly touches everyone’s daily lives when using electricity, 
consuming clean water, utilizing mass transportation, and communicating via cell 
phones or computers.106 The CI systems and facilities that provide these 
foundational services have become increasingly computer reliant and networked. 
Computerized components, called ICS, measure and control many of the 
industrial or mechanical processes needed to produce the desired outputs of this 
nation’s CIs.  
A. CI DEPENDENCY ON ICS COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 
Computerized ICS are vital components in U.S. CI industries. They 
facilitate the ability to manage multiple sites or processes from a single control 
center.107 The networking of separate ICS has made it possible to achieve 
extraordinary efficiency thanks to the management of real time system 
information during industrial processes.108 
ICS facilitate the management and regulation of the generation, 
transmission, and distribution of electricity.109 It is accomplished for example by, 
“opening and closing circuit breakers and setting thresholds for preventive 
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shutdowns.”110 The electric and gas industry controls refinery operations by 
using integrated ICS to, “remotely monitor the pressure and flow of gas pipelines, 
and control the flow and pathways of gas transmission.”111  
Water utilities monitor well levels, control pumps, and water flows, and 
measure tank levels or pressure, remotely with ICS.112 They also remotely 
monitor water quality characteristics, such as pH, turbidity and chlorine levels, 
and even control the addition of chemicals with ICS.113 The enhanced 
productivity facilitated by ICS has led to greater reliance on these computerized 
systems to maximize the efficiency and output from U.S. CIs.  
B. OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN CI 
ICS are computerized components, which are often networked, that 
control industrial processes through four basic steps. The first step is taking the 
accurate measurement of the status or condition of a process. The second step 
involves a controller evaluating potential actions to affect the process after 
considering that measurement and comparing it to the system’s programmed 
optimal functioning values. The third step is the controller sending an output 
signal to alter the process based on the controller’s evaluation of the 
measurement. The resulting fourth and final step is the reaction to that output 
signal that manipulates the process itself toward optimal efficiency.114  
CI ICS may be classified within one of three common and widely used 
categories. The three primary categories are programmable logic computers 
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(PLCs), distributed control systems (DCSs) and supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA)115 systems. 
Small computers called PLCs are used to control the automation of many 
electromechanical processes, such as the movement of machinery along an 
assembly line.116 PLCs were first developed to aid in the mechanization of the 
automotive manufacturing industry. General Motors integrated the first PLCs into 
assembly lines in 1968 to replace hard-wired controller systems.117 Since that 
time, PLCs have contributed greatly to the development and optimization of 
factory automation.118  
PLCs have a programmable memory for storing instructions needed to 
carry out specific industrial functions.119 Some of those functions include logic, 
timing, counting communication, arithmetic, and data processing.120 The output 
of the PLC may include regulating functions, such as operational control of 
automobile assembly line processes, and power plant soot blowers.121 PLCs are 
often networked with both SCADA and DCS technologies as, “control 
components of hierarchical systems to provide local management of processes 
through feedback control.”122  
DCSs are specially designed ICS used to control complex and distributed 
applications within a facility.123 DCS controller components are distributed 
throughout an entire plant area but within the same geographic location.124 
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These systems maintain supervisory control over multiple integrated systems 
responsible for localized industrial processes and are programmed to maintain 
process conditions around a desired set point.125 In current systems, DCSs may 
be incorporated with business computer networks to provide management with a 
real time view of plant operations.126 Some examples of CIs that use DCS 
technology during production include “oil refineries, water and wastewater 
treatment, electric power generation plants, chemical manufacturing plants, 
automotive production, and pharmaceutical processing facilities.”127 
SCADA systems are advanced ICS specifically designed to collect field 
data from instruments at dispersed field sites and then process that field data at 
a central computer facility.128 SCADA systems are the nerves transmitting 
signals and the brains processing those signals for many CI systems.129 SCADA 
systems merge the ability to monitor remote location physical sites, relay human 
initiated commands to those remote physical sites, and even take autonomous 
action to control industrial processes based on field device readings and 
established algorithms.130 These systemic reactions take place at near real time 
speed with a delay of only microseconds.131 SCADA systems are the primary 
conduits for the raw data readings transmitted to a control center and the 
resulting returning commands to alter the industrial processes back from the 
control center.132  
SCADA systems have become increasingly sophisticated and allow for the 
optimal operation of almost any process, automation, or manufacturing 
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system.133 As a result, many CIs now operate at a level of safety, reliability, and 
efficiency that had never been achievable in the past.134 SCADA systems 
facilitate operations in diverse CI distribution networks, such as water distribution 
systems, wastewater collection systems, oil and natural gas pipelines, electrical 
utility transmission systems, rail, and other public transportation systems.135 
C. CI STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
The GAO reports that 85% of this nation’s CI is privately owned.136 
Privately owned infrastructures include diverse properties, such as chemical 
plants, museums, casinos, hotels, conference centers, amusement parks, real 
estate, shopping centers, cell towers, Internet infrastructure, manufacturing 
facilities, dams, energy infrastructure, banks, farms, food processing facilities, 
hospitals, nuclear reactors, transportation carriers, and water treatment facilities. 
Government owned infrastructures include assets, such as military bases 
and facilities, defense industry production plants, public emergency services 
(police, fire and emergency medical), government owned utilities and 
government owned and controlled physical facilities. With this ownership diversity 
in mind, the DHS notes, “Ensuring the protection and resilience of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure is a shared responsibility among multiple stakeholders—
neither government nor the private sector alone has the knowledge, authority, or 
resources to do it alone.”137 The interdependency of U.S. CIs cannot be 
overstated. Even exclusively government owned CI, such as a military base or 
133 Henrie, “Cyber Security Risk Management in the SCADA Critical Infrastructure 
Environment,” 40. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Stouffer et al., Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security, 2–5. 
136 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection—Progress 
Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics (GAO-07-
39) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006), 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d0739.pdf. 
137 “Critical Infrastructure Protection Partnerships and Information Sharing,” last modified 
April 14, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-protection-partnerships-and-information-
sharing.  
 40 
government building, are dependent upon private sector CI for services, such as 
electricity, water services, and communications.  
D. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 
CI is defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013 as the, 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health 
or safety, or any combination of those matters.”138 PPD 21 identifies a total of 16 
separate CI sectors. Categorizing U.S. CI into sectors is the best way to evaluate 
them because each sector has unique characteristics, regulatory environments, 
operating intricacies, and risk profiles.139 The DHS breaks down U.S. CI into the 
following 16 sectors. 
The “chemical sector” is a vital element of the U.S. economy.140 It is 
interdependent with many other other CI sectors, and carries notable public 
safety implications due to hazards present in production processes. Much of the 
chemical sector is comprised of private sector entities, which necessitates 
collaboration between the DHS and private industry on security and resilience 
initiatives.141 
Structures within the “commercial facilities sector,” “operate on the 
principle of open public access, meaning that the general public can move freely 
throughout these facilities without the deterrent of highly visible security 
barriers.”142 Private sector ownership is common throughout this sector and little, 
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if any, government regulation or interaction occurs with facility operators.143 
Some of the building types included within the sector include stadiums, 
museums, casinos, hotels, conference centers, amusement parks, movie 
theatres, broadcast media studios, office buildings, condominium, or apartment 
buildings and shopping malls.144  
According to the DHS, the “communications sector” is, “an integral 
component of the U.S. economy, underlying the operations of all businesses, 
public safety organizations, and government.”145 It is identified as a particularly 
critical sector due to its role as a vital bridge between all CI sectors. The DHS 
notes the provision of these services, “has become interconnected; satellite, 
wireless, and wire line providers depend on each other to carry and terminate 
their traffic and companies routinely share facilities and technology to ensure 
interoperability.”146 The private sector owns and operates the majority of 
communications infrastructure. These stakeholders are primarily responsible for 
protecting the infrastructure, but work with the federal government on security 
and resilience initiatives.147  
The ”critical manufacturing sector” is yet another sector with key 
implications for the health of the U.S. economy.148 According to the DHS, “A 
direct attack on or disruption of key elements of the manufacturing industry could 
disrupt essential functions at the national level and across multiple critical 
infrastructure sectors.”149 The critical manufacturing sector includes four central 
industries as the sector’s foundation that includes “primary metal manufacturing; 
machinery manufacturing; electrical equipment, appliance, and component 









manufacturing; and transportation equipment manufacturing.”150 The bulk of the 
critical manufacturing sector is controlled by the private sector.  
According to the DHS, the “dams sector,” “delivers critical water retention 
and control services in the United States, including hydroelectric power 
generation, municipal and industrial water supplies, agricultural irrigation, 
sediment and flood control, river navigation for inland bulk shipping, industrial 
waste management, and recreation.”151 The sector is comprised of assets, such 
as “dam projects, hydropower generation facilities, navigation locks, levees, 
dikes, hurricane barriers, mine tailings, other industrial waste impoundments, and 
other similar water retention and water control facilities.”152 The dams sector 
shares interdependencies with many other sectors and contains over 87,000 
dams, of which roughly 65% share private ownership.153  
The “Defense Industrial Base Sector is the worldwide industrial complex 
that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, 
and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or 
parts, to meet U.S. military requirements.”154 The DHS reports that the, “Defense 
Industrial Base partnership consists of Department of Defense components, 
more than 100,000 Defense Industrial Base companies and their subcontractors 
who perform under contract to the Department of Defense, companies providing 
incidental materials and services to the Department of Defense, and government-
owned/contractor-operated and government-owned/government-operated 
facilities.”155 Simply put, this sector provides the many goods and services 
needed to conduct the military operations vital to defending U.S. interests.156 
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The DHS defines the “emergency services sector” as, “Our system of 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery elements that represent the 
nation’s first line of defense in the prevention and mitigation of risk from both 
intentional and unintentional manmade incidents, as well as from natural 
disasters.”157 The emergency services sector also defends the other 15 critical 
infrastructure sectors, which makes them all highly interdependent on this sector. 
emergency services sector assistance is provided primarily by state and local 
government agencies. The sector is built on the foundation of five primary 
disciplines to include “law enforcement; fire and emergency services; emergency 
management; emergency medical services and public works.”158 
“Energy sector” infrastructure powers this nation’s economy. According to 
the DHS, “without a reliable energy supply, health and welfare are threatened, 
and the U.S. economy cannot function.”159 Societal reliance on electricity means 
that all sectors share dependence on the energy sector.160 The DHS subdivides 
the energy sector into “three interrelated segments,” including “electricity, 
petroleum, and natural gas.”161 Over 80% of U.S. “energy sector” infrastructure is 
privately owned, and provides energy to the “transportation systems sector,” 
power to homes and commercial properties, and alternative energy products 
essential to powering society.162 This high percentage blend of private ownership 
within this critical sector requires the DHS to collaborate with key sector partners 
on security and resilience initiatives. 
The “financial services sector” plays a vital role in almost every other CI 
sector within the United States. The banking industry is collated and regulated 
based on the differing types of programs and products that banks provide to 
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customers.163 Institutions offer a wide array of programs and fluctuate widely in 
size from small community credit unions all the way up to established 
international banks with portfolios worth over a trillion dollars.164 According to the 
DHS, the sector contains, “more than 18,800 federally insured depository 
institutions” and “thousands of providers of various investment products.”165 
The DHS reports that the “food and agriculture sector” is, “almost entirely 
under private ownership and is comprised of an estimated 2.2 million farms, 
900,000 restaurants, and more than 400,000 registered food manufacturing, 
processing, and storage facilities.”166 The DHS adds that this sector is 
responsible for approximately 20% of overall U.S. financial activity and is 
interdependent with a number of other sectors, as it provides nourishment to 
those working in all of this country’s CI sectors.167 
The DHS points out that the “government facilities sector” includes a 
diverse range of structures, located both domestically and outside U.S. borders, 
which are controlled by “federal, state, local, and tribal governments.”168 The 
DHS notes further, “these facilities include general-use office buildings and 
special-use military installations, embassies, courthouses, national laboratories, 
and structures that may house critical equipment, systems, networks, and 
functions.”169 Along with buildings, the sector contains cyber components that, 
“contribute to the protection of sector assets (e.g., access control systems and 
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closed-circuit television systems) as well as individuals who perform essential 
functions or possess tactical, operational, or strategic knowledge.”170 
The DHS considers the “healthcare and public health sector” as vital, for 
its role in shielding the vulnerable U.S. economy from “hazards such as 
terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural disasters.”171 This sector 
also plays a critical role in mitigation, response, and recovery efforts during 
disaster responses. The DHS goes on to note that, “while healthcare tends to be 
delivered and managed locally, the public health component of the sector, 
focused primarily on population health, is managed across all levels of 
government: national, state, regional, local, tribal, and territorial.”172 The bulk of 
the “healthcare and public health sector” is controlled privately, so partnerships 
and intelligence exchanges between the government and private sectors are 
crucial to expanding resilience within this sector.173 
Due to societal reliance on digital communications technology, the DHS 
has identified the “information technology sector” as the foundation of, “the 
nation’s security, economy, public health and safety.”174 The DHS goes on to 
note, “businesses, governments, academia, and private citizens are increasingly 
dependent upon Information Technology Sector functions.” This sector’s 
operations yield the “hardware, software, information technology systems” and 
services people need to interact with the Internet.175 The functions of the IT 
sector are accomplished through a diverse network of primarily privately owned 
companies.176 
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The DHS identifies the “nuclear reactors, materials and waste sector” as 
being inclusive of “nuclear power plants; non-nuclear reactors used for research, 
testing and training; manufacturers of nuclear reactors or components; 
radioactive materials used primarily in medical, industrial, and academic settings; 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities; decommissioned nuclear power reactors; and 
transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste.”177 
Approximately one fifth of the electricity produced in the United States is 
generated through nuclear power. The DHS reports that there are, “100 
commercial nuclear reactors licensed to operate at 62 nuclear power plants.”178 
The potentially devastating consequences of sabotage or attacks in this sector 
make it an intense national security focal point. 
The U.S. “transportation systems sector” is responsible for the movement 
of cargo and passengers both domestically and internationally.179 Within this 
sector, the DHS identifies “seven key subsectors, or modes to include: aviation; 
highway infrastructure and motor carrier; maritime transportation system; mass 
transit and passenger rail; pipeline systems; freight rail; and postal and 
shipping.”180 This diverse and far-reaching sector is comprised of both 
government controlled and private sector owned components. The transportation 
systems sector is interdependent and intertwined with most of the other CI 
sectors.  
The “water and wastewater systems sector” is comprised of entities that 
provide clean drinking water delivery and wastewater disposal services to the 
U.S. population. The DHS reports, “There are approximately 160,000 public 
drinking water systems and more than 16,000 publicly owned wastewater 
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treatment systems in the United States.”181 In addition, the DHS determined, 
“approximately 84 percent of the U.S. population receives their potable water 
from these drinking water systems, and more than 75 percent of the U.S. 
population has its sanitary sewerage treated by these wastewater systems.”182 
Contaminated drinking water would constitute a real threat to the health and 
welfare of any affected population base in this country. 
E. CI ICS VULNERABILITIES 
Many of today’s CI linked ICS evolved from the networking of IT capability 
into existing physical systems that replaced or supplemented physical control 
mechanisms.183 Early ICS CI integrations were only susceptible “to local threats 
because their components were physically secured and were not connected” to 
company computer networks.184 However, the trend toward integrating ICS with 
IT networks and online services provides less isolation and greater exposure to 
external threats for these systems. Existing ICS were not necessarily designed to 
withstand recently developed cyber threats.185 Additionally, the prevalence of 
wireless networks places ICS at greater risk from hackers who only need to be 
relatively close in physical proximity, but do not need actual physical access to 
the equipment.186 Subsequently, early ICS, linked to corporate computer 
systems, are vulnerable to cyber attacks initiated through both wireless signals 
and the Internet.187  
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According to the NIST, threats to CI ICS arise from numerous potential 
adversaries including “hostile governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled 
employees, malicious intruders, complexities, accidents and natural 
disasters.”188 Potential manipulative incidents affecting CI ICS may be initiated 
through at least five potential attack vectors. One attack vector noted by NIST 
would be a disruption of system information or command transmission, within 
ICS networks, that would potentially affect safe CI plant operations. A second 
vector highlighted by NIST would be, “unauthorized changes to instructions, 
commands, or alarm thresholds. This could damage, disable, or shut down 
equipment, create environmental impacts and endanger human life.”189 
Misleading or false data transmitted to plant operations personnel is a third 
potential vector. NIST indicates such data could either cloak unauthorized 
system modulations or trigger operators to make ill-advised decisions on system 
operations, which may adversely impact CI facility operations. The modification 
of ICS software, configuration settings or malware infection is the fourth vector of 
concern noted by NIST that could have a number of negative side effects. Lastly, 
tampering with the processes of safety systems could put safety and lives at 
risk.190 
Boaru and Badita, of the Romanian National Defense University, reveal 
four factors that contribute to the escalated modern threat posture for ICS. The 
first factor is the widespread adoption of standardized technology with known 
vulnerabilities.191 Early implementations of ICS utilized proprietary, “hardware, 
software and network protocols,” which complicate understanding how specific 
ICS work and make them difficult to hack.192 It was a positive attribute from a 
security perspective. However, to cut costs and enhance productivity, companies 
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have been replacing older legacy ICS with cheaper common technologies.193 
These common technology systems unfortunately also carry common 
vulnerabilities, for which current malware already exists within the hacker 
community. As a result, a higher number of hackers have the skills required to 
initiate cyber attacks and a higher number of vulnerable ICS.194 
Boaru and Badita’s second noted factor, contributing to the escalated 
threat posture for ICS, is the network connectivity of ICS to other networks.195 
Companies frequently integrate their ICS with their corporate computer networks 
for business monitoring efficiency purposes. Some enterprises take this step 
further and connect their networks to those of strategic business partners and/or 
the Internet.196 In addition, many ICS make use of; “wide area networks, and the 
Internet, to transmit data and commands to dispersed stations and individual 
devices.”197 The merging of ICS networks with “public and enterprise networks” 
opens these systems to ICS security vulnerabilities.198 Absent appropriately 
robust security controls for both “the enterprise network and the ICS network,” a 
breach in the “enterprise network” can adversely impact ICS functions.199 
Boaru and Badita’s third factor, contributing to the escalated threat posture 
for ICS, is the use of insecure remote connections.200 Organizations often leave 
digital access ports open for remote access, diagnostics, and maintenance work 
on the system. Additionally, ICS that utilize wireless data transmission schemes 
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are particularly susceptible to cyber attacks.201 Hackers can use these 
connections to remote into the system if it is not protected with authentication 
protocols or encryption.202 Without these data safety measures, not much can be 
done to validate information traveling through unsecure wireless systems. 
Boaru and Badita’s fourth factor, contributing to the escalated threat 
posture for ICS, is the widespread distribution of technical information about ICS 
through the Internet.203 Public information about ICS and CI is easily accessible 
to hackers and malicious actors on the web. This availability was highlighted by a 
graduate student from George Mason University, who in his dissertation, 
“mapped every business and industrial sector in the American economy to the 
fiber-optic network that connects them, using material that was available publicly 
on the Internet.”204 Public records and information is a double-edged sword, 
which unlocks both increased capacity for study and increased vulnerability to 
those planning attacks. 
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IV. STUXNET ATTACK CASE STUDY
In June 2012, the cyber security landscape changed when a Belarusian 
cyber security firm named “VirusBlokAda”205 detected the presence of a new and 
sophisticated malware, later dubbed “Stuxnet,” in the computers of an Iranian 
nuclear facility. Other technology security firms joined the intense investigation of 
this unclaimed malware and determined that the Stuxnet worm had been 
specifically engineered to infect specialized Siemens computer components that 
were designed to run centrifuges in Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.206 This newly 
discovered malware surprised computer security specialists in that it sought no 
corporate or financial advantage like most malware of the era.207 The code was 
programmed to control and destroy discreetly the centrifuge components of the 
Natanz nuclear facility.208 Analysts logically concluded that Stuxnet was the first 
politically motivated cyber attack,209 and it showed that such an attack could 
cause significant physical damage to a CI facility.210  
A. WHAT IS STUXNET? 
Stuxnet was a “cyber-physical” attack, which means that the code actually 
caused real world physical damage, which requires interaction with three 
different CI layers and their specific vulnerabilities.211 The IT layer is exploited to 
spread the malware, the ICS layer is exploited to manipulate process control, and 
the physical layer is where the resulting damage is developed.212 The ultimate 
goal of Stuxnet was to sabotage Iran’s uranium enrichment facility by 
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reprogramming the PLCs controlling the fast spinning enrichment centrifuges, to 
ranges outside their specified boundaries, which would, in turn, damage the 
vulnerable centrifuge rotors.213 The Stuxnet attack provides a textbook example 
of how the exploitation of these three layers can be leveraged to create physical 
destruction during a cyber attack.214 See Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Cyber Physical Attack Layers 
 
Source: Ralph Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” The Langer Group, November 
2013, 4, http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/to-kill-a-centrifu 
ge.pdf. 
Operationally, Stuxnet is classified as a complex computer worm.215 
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to spread via computer networks.”216 Worms typically reside in a computer’s 
                                            
213 Nicolas Falliere, Liam Murchu and Eric Chen, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Symantec, 
February 2011, 2, https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/ 
whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
214 Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” 4. 
215 Karnouskos, “Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security.”  
216 Bradley Mitchell, “Computer Worm—Internet Security Terms,” Compnetworking, 
accessed February, 3, 2015, http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/worldwideweb/g/bldef_ 
worm.htm. 
Physical Layer 
Sensors, Valves, Drives, etc. Physical Damage of Equipmment 
Industrial Control System Layer 
Industrial Controllers Manipulation of Controls 
IT Layer 
Networks, Operating Systems, IT 
Applications Malware Propagation 
 53 
active memory and duplicate themselves. Worms use, “parts of an operating 
system that are automatic and are usually invisible to the user.”217 It is not 
uncommon for worms to go unnoticed until their replication depletes system 
memory to the point where it slows or modifies the computer’s operations.218 The 
500-kilobyte Stuxnet worm was specifically programmed to infect the system 
components of Iran’s high security Natanz uranium enrichment facility.219 
B. GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS FRAMING THE STUXNET ATTACK 
The Stuxnet attack should be viewed within the political context of the 
Iranian nuclear program. Iran was a ratifying signatory of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and completed their required International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement in 1974.220 Since that time, 
frequent and widespread concern has been raised that Iran has been seeking to 
develop nuclear weapons and has not lived up to the obligations of its 
commitment to the NPT. The controversy concerning Iranian nuclear weapons 
development programs began as early as 2002 when the IAEA began 
investigating allegations into clandestine nuclear activities in Iran.221 The IAEA 
determined verifiable non-compliance issues were present and Iran has 
developed a combative posture with the international community and the IAEA 
since that time, as it pertains to nuclear NPT compliance. 
In 2004, Iran began to experience a conservative political resurgence 
when conservatives regained control of the parliament in elections. This 
development was closely followed up with a hardline candidate, and Tehran 
mayor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, winning the presidential election in 2005, to 
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solidify conservative rule in Iran, which wrestled power away from reformist 
president Mohammad Khatami’s government.222 Ahmadinejad was quoted in 
2005 as saying Israel should be “wiped off of the face of the world” and then 
announced in 2006 that Iran had successfully enriched uranium.223 He also 
gained notoriety in 2005 for publicly denying the existence of the holocaust and 
calling the Nazi extermination campaign of Jews a “myth.”224 These 
developments occurred within the context of increasing Iranian tensions with both 
the U.N. and IAEA. It was the backdrop setting the stage for the development 
and deployment of the Stuxnet attack on Natanz.  
C. WHAT MADE STUXNET UNIQUE 
Stuxnet’s production and implementation achieved several milestones in 
malware or malicious code history. It is the first to exploit four “zero-day” 
vulnerabilities.225 A “zero day” refers to a vulnerability or exploitable gap in a 
computer program, which is unknown to the developer. Hackers may exploit this 
gap until the developer becomes aware and rushes to fix it with a security 
patch.226 Stuxnet was also the first malware to compromise two digital 
certificates.227 Digital certificates are, “trusted ID cards in electronic form that 
bind a website’s public encryption key to their identity for purposes of public 
trust.”228 Digital certificates are, “issued by independent, recognized and mutually 
trusted third parties,” which authenticate a website, and verify it is operating as 
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who it claims to be from a security standpoint.229 Finally, Stuxnet injected code 
into ICS and both reprogrammed them and successfully hid it from the operators, 
to create physical damage to machinery.230 
Stuxnet is a highly complex cyber weapon that required “nation-state” 
level resources for intelligence gathering, infiltration, and testing during its 
development.231 Cyber security industry experts believe developers would have 
needed to setup a target mirrored testing environment that included the 
necessary ICS hardware, PLCs, modules, and peripheral equipment to test their 
code.232 A fully functional mock uranium enrichment facility, replicating a top-
secret plant, would be beyond the reach of organized crime rings or terrorist 
organizations.233 However, Stuxnet has highlighted that successful cyber attacks 
on CI are possible. Less sophisticated, copycat style attacks of civilian CI targets 
could be made much easier utilizing the lessons learned from Stuxnet.234  
In fact, similar malware agents have already been deployed on energy 
sector CI targets since the discovery of Stuxnet. “Havex” is a Stuxnet like 
malware agent designed to conduct industrial espionage of energy sector ICS. 
Like Stuxnet, Havex gathers information from the local network and reports back 
to a command and control server.235 Havex was recently deployed to conduct 
industrial espionage on a number of European energy companies.236 The DHS 
has identified a similar and sophisticated malware agent dubbed “Black Energy,” 
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within the ICS of U.S. CI.237 Although developers with significant engineering 
expertise designed Black Energy for industrial espionage, experts believe it could 
be weaponized to inject destructive code directly into ICS.238  
In July 2010, Symantec deployed a strategy to analyze web data 
exchanges with the Stuxnet “command and control servers.”239 Symantec was 
provided with a vantage point to, “observe rates of infection and identify the 
locations of infected computers.”240 See Figure 3. Symantec’s data identified 
approximately 100,000 infected hosts with just fewer than 60% being located in 
Iran.241 This concentration of infections indicates that Iran was the initial target 
for infections with the other infections likely being “collateral damage.”242  
Figure 3.  Global Distribution of Stuxnet Infections 
 
Source: Nicolas Falliere, Liam Murchu, and Eric Chen, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 
Symantec, February 2011, 6, https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterpri 
se/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
                                            




239 Falliere, Murchu, and Chen, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 5–6. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. 






D. STUXNET FUNCTIONALITY AND PHASED DEPLOYMENT  
Stuxnet was engineered to be hand carried into the Natanz plant to infect 
the computers. The Natanz computers were a closed system, absent Internet 
connectivity, which required Stuxnet to be physically introduced by a device, 
such as a corrupted removable drive.243 Symantec experts believe, “this may 
have occurred by infecting a willing or unknowing third party, such as a 
contractor who perhaps had access to the facility, or an insider.”244 Once 
introduced to the facility, one of the primary propagation methods for Stuxnet was 
that it was designed to copy itself onto inserted removable drives each time one 
was used. This method exploited the closed system environment of Natanz 
where operators exchanged data with other computers by using removable 
drives.245 Stuxnet also had the ability to replicate itself and spread once it 
infected a host computer with network access.246  
Stuxnet is a sophisticated malware agent that was part of a multi-stage 
attack, which is outlined in Figure 4. The initial stage called for the development 
of computer code called a beacon that would be installed onto the computers at 
the facility.247 The beacon created a network blueprint, or map of the Natanz 
plant, to detail how the computer systems controlled the centrifuges.248 Duqu, a 
data-stealing piece of malware, is believed to be the reconnaissance agent used 
to map the Natanz computer network in 2007.249 Once the mapping task was 
completed, the beacon covertly reported home on its work, through the Internet, 
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using the networked computers to which it had spread.250 This covert data 
transmission, sent back to the Stuxnet command and control servers in Malaysia 
and Denmark, was facilitated through two bogus websites set up cleverly to 
disguise the web traffic as legitimate soccer fan activity through 
“mypremierfutbol.com” and “todaysfutbol.com.”251  
The payload portion of the Stuxnet worm was then injected into Natanz 
and covertly worked its way through the computer network to the targeted and 
pre-designated PLCs.252 During this next stage of the attack, the Stuxnet worm 
modified the code running the facility’s PLCs to change their programmed 
operations.253 These PLCs controlled the precise speed needed to spin the 
centrifuges used for uranium enrichment properly. Stuxnet caused the 
centrifuges to spin off speed and out of control, while at the same time, reporting 
false data to the operators that operations were progressing normally.254  
Rotor wall pressure is a vulnerability for centrifuges and its control is a 
function of process pressure and rotor speed.255 The easiest way to increase 
rotor wall pressure, and system stress, is to speed up the rotors. Stuxnet 
reprogrammed the PLCs that spun the centrifuges at 63,000 rpm, to speed them 
up by one-third, to 84,600 rpm for periods of 15 minutes at a time.256 This 
increase led to the premature degradation and destruction of centrifuge 
components, delays in enrichment activities, and baffled scientists at the plant 
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who began to look incompetent as a result of the recurring and unexplained 
damage.257 
Figure 4.  Stuxnet Phased Deployment Timeline 
Source: Jim Finkle, “Factbox: Cyber Warfare Expert’s Timeline for Iran Attack,” 
Reuters, December 2, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/02/us-cyber 
attack-iran-idUSTRE7B10AV20111202. 
E. OUTCOME AND CONSEQUENCES OF STUXNET 
Reuters news service reported, “in November 2010, Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that malicious software had created problems in 
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some of Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges” at Natanz.258 A network of 
surveillance cameras, installed by UN weapons inspectors, were already in place 
at Natanz and provided unfiltered first hand access to the effects of Stuxnet.259  
Cameras monitoring plant activity captured unexpected images of workers 
removing suspicious crates full of broken centrifuge equipment.260 During a six-
month period that began in late 2009, UN officials watched Natanz workers 
dismantle more than 10% of the plants 9,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges.261 
IAEA records from that time show Iran struggling to cope with major equipment 
failures.262 
Those same IEAE records also show a concerted and successful effort to 
limit the damage and replace broken equipment.263 Although Stuxnet initiated 
serious malfunctions in the Natanz centrifuges, Iran declared in late 2010 that it 
had eliminated the malware from its systems.264 U.S. and European officials, 
who insisted on anonymity, reported that their experts agreed with the Iranians 
that they had successfully neutralized Stuxnet and had rooted it from their 
computers.265 The Institute for Science and International Security also analyzed 
the effects of the Stuxnet attack and determined it had slowed the development 
and progress of the uranium enrichment campaign at Natanz but had not 
completely disabled it.266  
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F. THE FUTURE OF STUXNET 
The Stuxnet worm is the first publicly recognized example of a cyber-
weapon being used to attack industrial machinery.267 It provided a blueprint for 
how to conduct a specifically targeted and innovative cyber-warfare attack on the 
computer systems of a CI target.268 More specifically, it shows potential cyber 
adversaries how to inject malicious code into real time ICS controllers, how to 
override legitimate control code that remains running, and how to report fake 
sensor data back to system operators and controllers.269 This attack is a treasure 
trove of knowledge and lessons, left behind by the attackers, which may be 
copied and customized into malware tools to make it available to all.270 
Opinions have been conflicting as to how Stuxnet spread from its intended 
target at Natanz. Author David Sanger wrote that an error in the Stuxnet code 
allowed it to infect an engineer’s computer as he worked at Natanz. When he left 
the plant and connected his computer to the Internet, the Stuxnet worm spread 
and began replicating itself in other locations around the world.271 The Symantec 
Stuxnet dossier attributes the spread of Stuxnet to its programmed replication 
methods and considers the infected machines outside of Iran to be collateral 
damage and a necessary consequence of the creators being certain the malware 
would reach its intended target.272 The Langer Group theorizes that the attackers 
may have recognized that blowing their cover could come with benefits and 
uncovering Stuxnet was the intended end of the operation, as it would show the 
world what cyber weapons can do in the hands of a competent cyber armed 
superpower.273 Regardless of the root cause of the spread of Stuxnet, the result 
                                            
267 Finkle, “Researchers Say Stuxnet Was Deployed against Iran in 2007.”  
268 Karnouskos, “Stuxnet Worm Impact on Industrial Cyber-Physical System Security.” 
269 Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” 19. 
270 Ibid., 20. 
271 Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran.”  
272 Falliere, Murchu and Chen, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 3. 
273 Langer, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” 16. 
 62 
is that this code is now publicly available to those who are seeking it on the 
Internet. It could be modified or tailored to stage attacks on the ICS of other CIs 
throughout the world.274 
Retired U.S. General Mike Hayden told CBS News, “We have entered into 
a new phase of conflict in which we use a cyber-weapon to create physical 
destruction, and in this case, physical destruction to someone else’s critical 
infrastructure.”275 Professor Paul Dorey, of the University of London, notes that it 
is likely that any form of modern warfare, moving forward, will include attacks on 
private sector CI to affect that nation’s ability to defend itself.276 This highlights 
the critical importance of partnerships between privately controlled CIs and 
government agencies with cyber-defense responsibility. 
The Stuxnet worm is the first publicly known use of a cyber-weapon to 
destroy the CI of another country, accomplishing with computer programming, 
what only used to be possible through bombing or traditional sabotage.277 Some 
researchers, such as Ralph Langer of Germany, believe Stuxnet has opened a 
“Pandora’s Box” for cyber threats that will only increase with time. He makes the 
point that the next generation of malware, inspired by Stuxnet, will be even more 
dangerous and difficult to neutralize.278 
In June 2012, U.S. House Intelligence Committee Chairmen Mike Rogers 
told CBS News, “We will suffer a catastrophic cyber attack. The clock is 
ticking.”279 Many of the privately owned CIs in this nation have been slow to 
invest in updated security measures for their ICS, with some running 30-year-old 
systems.280 Cyber security legislative bills have stalled due to fears that 
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mandated security updates would be too costly for businesses.281 The cyber 
threats to U.S. CI systems are real and this vulnerability is shared between 
private companies and the government.  
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V. STUXNET IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS  
The Stuxnet attack on Natanz was a groundbreaking event with serious 
implications related to cyber security for CIs, the vulnerability of ICS to 
manipulation and cyber warfare. The Stuxnet attack was a first of a kind historical 
event and should be examined for potential lessons learned moving forward. The 
world’s first cyber attack, targeting the CI of a nation, raises a number of yet 
unanswered questions. With U.S. CI security responsibility split between the 
government and private sectors, what are the implications? Are the implications 
for the government and private sectors the same or are they different? What are 
the implications for our educational system? Does the United States have the 
experts needed to defend U.S. CI against cyber attacks? Finally, what are the 
ethical implications involved in both offensive and defensive cyber operations? 
These topics should be explored, as cyberspace now opens as the fifth domain 
of warfare, and the first ever-manmade military domain.282 
A. STUXNET’S EXPLOITATION OF VULNERABILITIES  
Stuxnet is a highly refined and complex cyber weapon, designed for 
stealth that could have avoided detection and done its damage in many CI 
environments around the world. Therefore, lessons should be extracted and 
absorbed for U.S. CI cybersecurity. What made a closed system, high security CI 
facility vulnerable to a cyber attack, absent Internet connectivity? How did the 
attack manage to spread through the non-networked systems that controlled the 
Natanz ICS? How was Stuxnet able to work undetected, under the purview of 
highly trained engineers, and destroy 10% of the facility’s centrifuges? These 
questions may be answered by examining three critical points of failure. The 
critical points include system access, system security, and policy. These three 
crucial points all contributed to the failures that allowed Stuxnet to infiltrate, thrive 
within, and destroy centrifuges at Natanz.  
                                            
282 Glenny and Kavanaugh, “800 Titles but No Policy—Thoughts on Cyber Warfare,” 288.  
 66 
Even with all its technological sophistication, the Stuxnet attack on Natanz 
would not have been possible without the injection of human vulnerability.283 The 
first point of failure at Natanz leading to the Stuxnet infection was the insider 
threat of system access at the facility. Stuxnet was engineered to be hand carried 
into the Natanz plant to infect the computer network. The Natanz computers were 
a closed system, absent Internet connectivity, which required Stuxnet to be 
physically introduced by a device, such as a corrupted removable drive.284 
Symantec experts believe, “this may have occurred by infecting a willing or 
unknowing third party, such as a contractor who perhaps had access to the 
facility, or an insider.”285  
Attacks originating from an internal source or insider at a facility have the 
potential to do the most damage because insiders have direct access to sensitive 
systems and data. Employees, contractors, and management are all potential 
inside threats. Insiders also possess the means and knowledge necessary to 
access information and manipulate systems without raising suspicion.286 Insider 
threats are not always intentional. In fact, a 2015 SANS Institute survey of 772 IT 
security professionals from across the industry spectrum revealed that 69% 
believed that negligent employees and contractors posed the top cyber security 
threat to their organizations.287 This survey provides unique insight into where 
professionals in the field believe their biggest threats to network security lie.  
Insider threats may be divided into two broad categories. The first 
category involves malicious individuals, with access to a facility, who deliberately 
create harm. The second category encompasses negligent or accidental insider 
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threats. It involves individuals with access to facilities or networks who do not 
follow established security practices and breed vulnerability through the improper 
handling of data, systems, and networks.288 The individuals in this second 
category typically do their damage without the actual intent to do harm. Their 
actions may be simply characterized as unaware, unconcerned, lazy, or careless. 
Netdiligence is a cyber risk assessment and data breach services 
company that conducts an annual cyber insurance claims study each year. It 
started collecting data on insider involvement in cyber damage claims to 
insurance companies two years ago, and its survey findings have been 
comparable for the past two years. The 2015 report notes approximately one 
third of all cyber insurance claims paid out were determinable to insider 
vulnerabilities. Of those 2015 insider damage claims, two thirds were 
unintentional in nature.289  
The Sans and Netdiligence surveys highlight a notable point. Insider 
threats are receiving growing notoriety among IT industry professionals as a 
major vulnerability. Insiders are also doing their part to justify this anxiety, with 
much of their damage being done unintentionally. The fact remains that negligent 
insiders spawn potential network access portals for malicious outsiders and 
incubate potential vulnerability for CI in the United States. No one may ever know 
specifically who infected Natanz, but it is clear that insider access played a 
paramount role in the attack. The same vulnerabilities likely exist within many 
U.S. CIs.  
The second point of failure at Natanz was the spread of Stuxnet through 
an air-gapped network to the PLCs, which controlled the precise spinning speed 
needed for proper centrifuge operations. Once Stuxnet infiltrated the Natanz 
network, through an infected removable drive host, it still had to move through 
the air-gapped computers to the PLCs, which controlled the precise spin speeds 
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of the plant’s centrifuges. In this instance as well, Stuxnet was cleverly 
engineered to take advantage of a systemic weakness.  
Isolated and air gapped systems, such as the one at Natanz, have limited 
options when it comes to moving data between physically separated network 
computer systems.290 Stuxnet was programmed to copy itself onto inserted 
removable drives, each time one was used, as one of its primary propagation 
methods. Thus, each time an infected removable drive was used to move data or 
instructions from one computer to another, the Stuxnet worm was also implanted. 
This move exploited the closed system environment of Natanz in which operators 
exchanged data with other computers by using removable drives, which thus 
spread Stuxnet continuously throughout the facility from computer to 
computer.291 Stuxnet also had the ability to replicate itself and autonomously 
spread through networked systems once it infected a host computer with network 
access.292  
These first two points of failure, system access and system security, fall 
into line with the third point of failure, which is policy. Although the Iranian 
government will not publicly share its Natanz policy portfolio, a deficiency in 
either establishing or following appropriate security protocols led to the system 
access and system security breakdowns noted as the first two points of failure. 
Effective technology security policy should focus inward on vulnerabilities rather 
than outward toward threats, due to the ever-evolving nature of cyber threats.293 
Insiders were highlighted earlier as an important threat vector according to 
cybersecurity experts; thus, human factors related to protecting CI ICS systems 
should not be neglected. Stuxnet is a glaring example of vulnerability posed by 
insider threats since an insider with a removable drive introduced it. Policy and 
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procedure related to insider access should be effectively written, communicated, 
and enforced to limit system and sensitive data access to the smallest number of 
authorized users possible.294 The policy should extend beyond employees to 
management, visitors, contractors, and even business partners. The objective is 
to restrict access as tightly as possible, while still allowing for efficient business 
operations, to narrow the insider threat vector as much as possible. 
Stuxnet’s propagation through the Natanz computer systems could also 
have been affected from a technology security policy standpoint. Removable 
drive infections are known to be common.295 Policy restrictions on the use of 
portable media and drives, along with the encryption of sensitive system data, 
could have greatly reduced the vulnerability at Natanz had such restrictions been 
followed.296 Data could still be securely moved through air-gapped CI systems 
like Natanz on removable storage drives with specific removable drive security 
software that is backed up by policies specifying which devices can be used and 
by whom.  
Michael Davis, of Information Week Analytics, wrote an article entitled, 
“Stuxnet Reality Check: Are You Prepared for a Similar Attack?”297 He asserts 
that “removable storage device security software” is the most effective 
countermeasure to USB infections.298 Davis writes further, “removable storage 
device security software prevents unknown or unauthorized USB drives, 
CDs/DVDs, external drives, digital music players,” and other devices that could 
carry infections, from being accepted by and uploading data to facility 
computers.299 Davis maintains, “These tools should be utilized and reinforced 
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with policies that specify which, if any, removable storage devices can be used 
on a particular computer and by whom.”300 The facility may then close the 
system’s communication loop by providing authorized users with the acceptable 
authorized drives for data transfer that the software will validate before 
connecting.301 The reinforcement of strong policy defenses with technology 
further strengthens CI computer network defense.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR A CI CYBER ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES  
Increasing concern has been raised among government officials and 
private sector experts about the cyber security of the ICS that govern U.S. CIs. 
U.S. government experts were interviewed for a CBS News 60 Minutes episode 
entitled “Stuxnet,” which aired on March 4, 2012. The interviews resulted in some 
candid quotes revealing how consequential of a threat a cyber attack, similar to 
Stuxnet, could be to the United States. Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta 
stated, “There’s a strong likelihood that the next Pearl Harbor that we confront 
could very well be a Cyberattack.” Former FBI Director Robert Mueller was 
quoted as saying, “I do believe that the cyberthreats will equal or surpass the 
threat from counterterrorism in the foreseeable future.” Former House 
Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers said, “We will suffer a 
catastrophic cyberattack. The clock is ticking.”  
Technological advances have led to ICS components making increasingly 
critical automated decisions, in industrial processes, which used to be the 
responsibility of human operators. These advances have spawned enhanced CI 
vulnerability to ICS cyber attacks and makes those attacks potentially even more 
consequential.302 According to Nasser Abouzakhar, of the University of 
Hertfordshire, the manipulation of intricate processes in ICS can cause “threshold 
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levels to build beyond safe operating parameters.”303 He continues that this 
manipulation, may, in turn, result in disasters, the loss of lives or a long-term loss 
of vital services.304 A foreign intelligence service or high functioning terrorist 
group, with sufficient resources, could undertake a nearly anonymous cyber 
attack on the U.S. electric power grid without ever entering the country.305 
The potential impacts of a CI cyber attack targeting ICS could be a 
combination of physical, economic, and social effects. Physical impacts are the 
direct result of an ICS failure and include personal injury, loss of lives, and 
property and environmental damage.306 Economic impacts are a second order 
effect resulting from the physical impact. Unavailability of damaged CI may have 
long standing negative effects to the local, regional, and national economy.307 
Social impacts are another second order effect that includes the loss of 
confidence by the public in the company or government entity operating a CI 
impacted by a cyber attack.308 
Numerous potential consequential events may result from a cyber attack 
to a CI or an ICS component of a CI. A number of these consequential events 
are common to many of the sectors, while others are more individualized. Some 
of the potential consequences include: injury or death of employees; injury or 
death of citizens; damage to equipment and property; loss of production 
capability; release, diversion, or theft of hazardous materials; environmental 
damage; long or short term loss of critical services; product contamination; 
criminal or civil liability; loss of confidential information; loss of customer 
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confidence; and impacts on national security.309 Table 1 highlights potential 
cyber attack impacts for the 16 CI sectors. 
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Table 1.   CI Cyber Attack Consequences 
 
 
• Injury or death of employees or the public 
• Release, diversion or theft of hazardous materials 
• Environmental damage  
Chemical Sector 
• Loss of lives 
• Civil liability 
• Loss of customer confidence 
Commercial Facilities Sector 
• Loss of critical service availability 
• Damage to equipment and property 
• Economic damage 
Communications Sector 
• Impact on national security 
• Loss of production capacity 
• Economic damage 
Critical Manufacturing Sector 
• Loss of lives 
• Environmental damage 
• Property damage 
Dams Sector 
• Impact on national security 
• Loss of production capacity 
• Economic damage 
Defense Industrial Base 
Sector 
• Long or short term loss of critical services 
• Lives and property left at risk 
• Loss of public confidence in government 
Emergency Services Sector 
• Loss of production capacity 
• Economic damage 
• Lives and property left at risk 
Energy Sector 
• Economic damage 
• Loss of customer confidence in banking 
• Loss of business production capability 
Financial Services Sector 
• Product contamination and risk to human lives 
• Loss of production capability 
• Economic damage 
Food and Agriculture Sector 
• Long or short term loss of critical services 
• Damage to equipment and property 
• Loss of public confidence in government 
Government Facilities Sector 
• Long or short term loss of critical services 
• Injury or death of citizens 
• Civil liability 
Healthcare and Public Health 
Sector 
• Long or short term loss of critical services 
• Loss of confidential information 
• Impact on national security 
Information Technology 
Sector 
• Release, diversion or theft of hazardous materials 
• Environmental damage 
• Impact on national security 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials 
and Waste Sector 
• Loss of transportation services 
• Injury or death of citizens 
• Economic damage 
Transportation Systems 
Sector 
• Drinking water contamination 
• Injury or death of citizens 
• Environmental damage 
Water and Wasewater 
Systems Sector 
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According to NIST, “U.S. critical infrastructure is often referred to as a 
‘system of systems’ because of the interdependencies that exist between its 
various industrial sectors as well as interconnections between business 
partners.”310 This interconnection and mutual dependency results in a 
phenomenon where an issue at one CI can directly disrupt other CIs through 
“cascading and escalating failures.”311 Electric power failures are a common 
example of cascading disruptions to interdependent CIs.312 Power outages affect 
every other CI sector because they all rely on electrical power to operate.  
NIST points out, “A cascading failure can be initiated by a disruption of the 
microwave communications network used for an electric power transmission 
SCADA system.”313 NIST adds, “the lack of monitoring and control capabilities 
could cause a large generating unit to be taken offline, an event that would lead 
to loss of power at a transmission substation.”314 The transmission substation 
failure could create, “a major imbalance, which triggers a cascading failure 
across the power grid.”315 That grid failure could result in, “large scale blackouts 
that could potentially affect oil and natural gas production, refinery operations, 
water treatment systems, wastewater collection systems, and pipeline transport 
systems that rely on the grid for electric power.”316  
Other potential consequences of an electric grid failure include failures of 
telephone communications networks, public safety radio systems, chemical 
plants, and hazardous materials facilities, which could all endanger public health, 
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public safety, and the environment.317 The possibilities for both cascading CI 
failures between interdependent sectors, and their resulting potential 
consequences, are nearly endless. Cyber security for vulnerable CI ICS must be 
a top priority to ensure the orderly function of every segment of modern society.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
Stuxnet’s implications for the U.S. government and private sectors are 
intertwined, much like the infrastructure itself, and highlight the necessity of 
coordination between the sectors as it pertains to protecting U.S. CI ICS from 
cyber threats. As noted by the DHS: 
Cyberspace is particularly difficult to secure due to a number of 
factors: the ability of malicious actors to operate from anywhere in 
the world, the linkages between cyberspace and physical systems, 
and the difficulty of reducing vulnerabilities and consequences in 
complex cyber networks. Of growing concern is the cyber threat to 
critical infrastructure, which is increasingly subject to sophisticated 
cyber intrusions that pose new risks.318  
The DHS contends that as computer technology innovates and continues 
to integrate with operational CI processes, an increased vulnerability occurs to 
elevated-consequence cyber incidents that could create damage, threaten lives, 
or interfere with the crucial services on which Americans count.319 With this risk 
and consequence in mind, the DHS considers “strengthening the security and 
resilience of cyberspace” a crucial “homeland security” mission.320 Societal 
reliance on technological innovation, and the inherent threats from within the 
cyber realm, will only increase in the years to come. 
The U.S. government response to the emerging class of cyber threats has 
been bifurcated between the military and civilian sectors. The U.S. government 
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identified cyberspace as the fifth domain of warfare.321 In June 2009, the 
Secretary of Defense ordered the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command to 
institute a new cyber focused sub-command. In October 2010, the United States 
Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) emerged as fully operational from its 
headquarters at Fort Meade, MD. Its mission is defined as:  
USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and 
conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified 
Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and 
when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace 
operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure 
US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to 
our adversaries.322  
Although its responsibilities are clearly militarily focused, it is important to 
note that cyber attacks on CI may be considered acts of war that could draw 
USCYBERCOM into the defense of CIs within the United States.  
On the domestic front, the DHS bears responsibility for the difficult task of 
CI cyber defense and attack mitigation. The DHS utilizes what it describes as a 
“risk informed, all hazards approach to safeguarding CI in cyberspace.”323 The 
DHS also takes the lead role in coordinating with, “sector specific agencies, other 
federal agencies and private sector partners to share information of analysis on 
cyber threats and vulnerabilities to promote and to understand more fully of the 
interdependency of infrastructure systems nationwide.”324 The DHS reports its 
collective approach is to “prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 
investigate, and recover from cyber incidents prioritizes understanding and 
meeting the needs of our partners, and is consistent with the growing recognition 
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among corporate leaders that cyber and physical security are interdependent and 
must be core aspects of their risk management strategies.”325 
The private sector’s ownership of approximately 85% of U.S. CI326 makes 
it potentially the vulnerable soft underbelly of this country’s CI cyber protection 
posture. Furthermore, some companies or industries may be more effective than 
government entities in implementing protection strategies. However, the 
fragmented nature of private sectors makes uniform measures and the 
implementation of best practices very difficult to achieve. Even though some 
industries have professional or technical associations for their respective fields, 
each organization is ultimately individually driven.  
Segments of the U.S. private sector philosophically object to government 
mandated cybersecurity measures. Some consider such measures to be an 
unnecessary layer of extra government regulation.327 Others argue that 
mandating cybersecurity measures will actually hamper cybersecurity innovation 
within the private sector. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has actually taken an 
official position against any legislation establishing private sector cybersecurity 
standards.328 
When talking about private industry motivation, profit is certainly a driving 
factor in business. Compelling private sector companies to improve cybersecurity 
carries a substantial price tag that could affect short-term profits. Some 
organizations believe that since the United States has not suffered a prominent 
cyber disruption of control systems, spending the time and money to prematurely 
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update security for ICS is not economically justifiable when their current systems 
were designed to have 20+ year lifespans.329  
Although the DHS has a few voluntary programs for private sector CI, their 
key focal point to the national strategy for securing U.S. government and private 
sector ICS is the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team 
(ICS-CERT). ICS-CERT responds to investigate ICS incidents; conducts 
vulnerability analyses; provides onsite incident response services; provides 
actionable intelligence for situational awareness; coordinates the discrete 
disclosure of vulnerabilities and mitigations; and provides information products 
and alerts regarding vulnerabilities and threats.330 ICS-CERT also coordinates 
information sharing with federal, state, and local agencies, the intelligence 
community, and private sector constituents to provide a direct pipeline for 
coordination among all stakeholders.331  
D. EDUCATIONAL AND WORKFORCE IMPLICATIONS  
A potentially overlooked but vitally important implication of the Stuxnet 
attack focuses on the education and skill sets of the people employed to protect 
U.S. CIs from cyber attacks in both the private and government sectors. Rapid 
technical innovations and advancements in computer technology within U.S. CIs 
require the services of an increasingly technologically astute workforce. 
Uncertainty surrounds U.S. capability to educate and train a sufficiently educated 
and sized workforce in cyber defense. This uncertainty is a concern within both 
the government and private sectors, which actually compete with each other for 
talent, as job requirements grow increasingly more technical and complex. The 
U.S. capacity to maintain it’s standing as a technology innovator is key to the 
nation’s ability to protect U.S. CIs and their computerized ICS from future attacks.  
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The Institute for National Strategic Studies researched this key 
vulnerability and found, “widespread agreement in the public and private sectors 
that U.S. educational institutions are unable to meet the growing demand for 
cyber workforce professionals.”332 A March 2015 study of Bureau of Labor 
Statistics data revealed that more than 209,000 U.S. cyber security jobs were 
unfilled.333 Postings for cyber security jobs are up 74% over the past five years 
and demand for these types of jobs is expected to grow by 53% through the year 
2018.334 The United States currently has a gap to fill in being able to educate 
and train enough talent for the workforce, fast enough to keep up with the current 
pace of hiring. The resultant outcome of this gap is the frequent raiding of talent 
from government agencies or competitors by the cyber security and private 
industries.335 
The cornerstone educational fields within the cyber security realm have 
long been considered science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM).336 These disciplines will always be pertinent to the field but a need 
exists to cast a wider net to capture more multidisciplinary focused students while 
increasing the traditional talent pool. The foundation for effective secondary 
education takes place at the K-12 level. Ensuring the strength of the primary level 
STEM curriculum is a key element to ensuring the future security of U.S. CIs. 
School districts must also find ways overcome budget-constrained environments 
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and shortages of qualified teachers to find ways to expose students to classes in 
programming and computer science.337  
E. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment program at Natanz has 
ushered in a new era of non-traditional conflict and raises a number of new 
ethical issues. Stuxnet raised the bar from wreaking cyber havoc to wreaking 
physical destruction, and as such, has released the proverbial cyber genie from 
the bottle and that genie will not be returning to confinement.338 Dilemmas 
posed, such as active vs. passive cyber defense, determining attribution of cyber 
attacks, discrimination in responses, proportionality in responses, and the 
consequences of escalation, affect the military, government, and private sector 
sectors alike. 
The GAO reports that during the 9-year period from 2006–2014, the 
number of CERT reported cybersecurity incidents directed toward systems 
supporting CI and federal operations rose by a staggering 1,120 percent, from 
5,503 in 2006 to 67,168 in 2014.339 It is not surprising that in light of this trend, 
President Obama authorized the U.S. government, in PPD 20, to employ 
defensive cyber effect operations on behalf of private sector organizations to 
protect CIs against cyber attacks.340 This possibility, does however, create 
interesting shared ethical dilemmas for the military, government, and private 
sectors. 
Cyber defense strategies can range anywhere from and in between 
merely stopping or preventing attacks to punishing cyber adversaries to deter 
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future attacks. Some have even labeled the U.S. move of indicting five Chinese 
Army officers, for hacking and commercial espionage in 2014, a unique public 
“shaming” tactic to try to leverage cultural pressures.341 Cyber defenses to 
attacks, such as Stuxnet, typically are either “passive” countermeasures to repel 
attacks or “active” countermeasures taking direct action against a threat.342 
Passive cyber defenses are designed to prohibit entry into a system, or if 
entry is made, to neutralize the threat and prevent damage, corruption of data 
systems, or the theft of information. These internal measures carry few ethical 
implications since they are focused inward but are commonly viewed as 
inadequate in defeating today’s advanced persistent threats from external 
sources.343 The inadequacy of passive cyber defense strategies alone sheds 
light on the potential need to field an ability to defend key cyber assets through 
the use of active cyber defenses.  
Active cyber defenses fall into the three general categories of detection 
and forensics, deception, and attack termination.344 These methods have three 
primary advantages. They assist in establishing the identity of the attacker; they 
may deter future attacks through retaliatory fear, and they can actually knock 
imminent cyber attacks off line.345 However, potential unintended consequences 
can occur, which may result from active cyber defense measures. The ethical 
waters get a little murky due to an attacker’s ability to disguise web attack 
vectors. A nation mistakenly employing active cyber defense countermeasures 
against an innocent party embroils itself in both ethical and legal issues. 
Attributing attacks to responsible parties, discriminating targeted responses to 
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avoid collateral damage, and keeping responses proportional are all challenging 
but necessary components of ethical active cyber defense. 
Assuming that an attack, such as Stuxnet, justifies an active cyber 
response, attributing the attack to a responsible party can be very difficult. 
Sometimes, a victimized entity may have no idea who the attacker is or may only 
be able to narrow the possibilities to “possible” or “probable.”346 Even worse, 
computer technology may now be used to mask certainty about the attacker’s 
location, equipment, identity, affiliation, or even implicate innocent parties.347 
Active cyber defense measures would only be ethically justifiable with certainty 
as to the aggressor’s identity. 
Discrimination is another key ethical issue related to cyber weapons. 
Although Stuxnet ultimately infected both military and civilian networks, it had 
safety measures programmed within the code to ensure that it only took action 
upon military targets within Natanz.348 However, in nations such as the United 
States, the government and military rely primarily on privately owned and 
operated communications networks. Active cyber countermeasures targeting 
government command and control would necessitate targeting civilian CI in many 
cases, which would create civilian collateral damage in the form of disrupted 
personal and commercial communications.349 
Proportionality is another ethical dilemma brought to the forefront by the 
active response to cyber attacks. The use of force in international law is generally 
limited to that which is needed to stop an attack. As such, cyber defense 
response options are in many ways ethically bound by the actions of the 
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perpetrator.350 In response, however, the entity deploying an active cyber 
defense must be aware of the effects of that response, even to third parties.351 
An adversary habitually stealing state or corporate secrets would justify only a 
proportional response that would not affect third parties.352 For example, a DDoS 
on the servers of an entity deemed to be committing ongoing thefts of secrets 
could cause disproportionate harm if that response took critical life support 
equipment off line at a medical facility.353  
It is debatable whether cyber attacks violate another state’s sovereignty or 
not. Since cyber attacks may not necessitate a physical presence in a state, and 
transmitted software is not necessarily physical, it could be argued that a nation’s 
territorial integrity was not violated.354 Therefore, a valid self-defense claim might 
not apply.355 Despite these arguments and dilemmas, what is most relevant are 
the consequences, such as whether cyber actions caused physical damage or 
tangible harm.356 Differentiation between active cyber defenses, and offensive 
cyber operations, such as Stuxnet, can be subjective and open to 
interpretation.357 Thus, the real potential for escalating cyclic cyber responses is 
created. Perhaps, an even more threatening result to the ethical dilemmas posed 
by cyber attacks is the further escalatory response possibility of crossing the 
threshold to physical retaliation in the form of military action.358 These are all 
ethical dilemma’s arising from attacks, such as Stuxnet, that will be sorted out 
and debated for years to come as the cyber threat landscape continues to grow. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policymakers and industry experts have exhibited growing concern over 
CI cyber security for the past two decades. CIs are the lifeblood of contemporary 
civilization, and fuel the delivery of the crucial services that underpin the modern 
way of life. Cyber attacks on CI facilities could result in devastating physical, 
economic, and social consequences for communities. U.S. policy has been 
shaped over the past two decades by a growing recognition of cyber threats and 
the importance of cyber security, but those policies have not always been clearly 
articulated and streamlined nor consistently communicated.  
A. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT ISSUES  
CI systems have evolved to be increasingly networked and computer 
reliant. The industrial and mechanical processes of many of these systems are 
now monitored and controlled by computerized ICS. The interjection of 
autonomous computer technology into these operational processes has opened 
the door to cyber vulnerability. The 16 U.S. CI sectors have also evolved toward 
a state of interdependence that creates a heightened risk of cascading failures 
with far-reaching effects for multiple sectors in simultaneous events. The 
stakeholders tasked with responsibility for securing the 16 CI sectors in the 
United States are blended between the public and private sectors, which makes 
mandated compliance with cyber security best practice a daunting challenge.  
Security experts view the Stuxnet attack on Iran as a game changer. It is 
universally recognized as the first politically motivated cyber attack, targeting the 
CI of a nation, which created physical destruction. Many have likened it to the 
opening of a cyber Pandora’s Box as a new domain for terrorism, espionage, and 
military action. Stuxnet does expose educational, ethical, and legal challenges. 
Nations will need to field technically educated work forces to secure their cyber 
space and CIs from attacks. Ethical and legal boundaries need to be defined and 
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legally clarified within and across the international community, as it pertains to 
cyber offensive and defensive operations.  
B. U.S. VULNERABILITY TO CYBER ATTACKS 
Despite the securing of cyberspace becoming a growing national policy 
priority, the United States continues to be the target of a continuous stream of 
cyber attacks. Many of these attacks are directed at the CIs, which support the 
normal daily routine of the lives of Americans and the nation as a whole. A 
crippling malware attack to computer networks of CIs could be economically 
devastating and could even lead to the loss of lives. Disruptions in service could 
affect the government’s ability to provide basic domestic or international security 
services, create gaps in essential public sector services for lengthy periods of 
time, and foster a loss of public confidence in government.359 An examination of 
four recent cyber attacks targeting U.S. CI follows. 
United Airlines announced on July 29, 2015 that it had sustained a data 
breach of passenger manifest data in May or early June 2015. This information 
detailed the movement of millions of Americans, to include some who hold 
sensitive positions within government and industry. A foreign government is 
believed to have been responsible for this breach and could exploit this 
information in a number of ways.360 A foreign intelligence agency could cross-
reference passenger manifest data with the data stolen in the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) computer system breach. The OPM data 
identifies people in sensitive government positions who hold security clearances. 
Tracking the movements of such officials could expose key meeting sites, 
classified events, or even covert operations or personnel.  
On July 25, 2015, the unclassified email network servers of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, of the DOD, were accessed remotely following a “spear phishing” 
email ruse used to gain access to the system. This intrusion necessitated an 11-
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day shutdown of the network so it could be rebuilt and reconfigured. The work of 
nearly 4,000 military and civilian personnel was affected for the duration of the 
shutdown. Breaches of defense sector networks can directly impact the military’s 
ability to provide for national safety and security. It is suspected that a foreign 
government is responsible for this intrusion.361 
On June 4, 2015, OPM announced it had sustained two separate attacks 
over the past year, which resulted in the theft of very detailed personal 
information on 25.6 million government employees and security clearance 
holders. Nearly every federal agency, and numerous CI sectors, was struck as 
part of this attack. Intelligence agents believe a foreign government attempting to 
build a database on U.S. government employees sponsored this theft.362  
The implication for the identities of all U.S. security clearance holders to 
be known by a foreign government highlights significant vulnerabilities. One 
major concern would be the data being used by foreign governments to recruit 
U.S. government employees, who might be vulnerable to enticements or 
pressure, to spy on their behalf.363 Another concern would be a foreign 
intelligence agency using the information to uncover the true identities of Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert agents. Even though CIA data was largely 
shielded from this breach, operatives who formerly worked for other government 
agencies could be exposed. Additionally, foreign intelligence services could 
cross-reference U.S. embassy roster data with that from the OPM breach to 
identify, through a process of elimination, CIA officers stationed at foreign 
embassies who work under diplomatic cover.364  
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On April 8, 2015, the United States reported that Russian hackers had 
gained access to unclassified but sensitive White House computer networks, 
through State Department networks that have been previously compromised. 
Adversaries were able to access information that included emails sent and 
received by President Obama, and real time information about his schedule that 
was not available to the public. This probing of privileged presidential information 
has far reaching potential ramifications and could put both national security and 
people’s lives at risk.365  
The four previously mentioned examples occurred within a short four-
month window during 2015. Others could be listed, but these attacks clearly 
demonstrate a current cyber vulnerability not being adequately addressed 
through current U.S. policy and practice.  
C. CI VULNERABILITY AND EMERGING GLOBAL EMPHASIS ON 
CYBER WEAPONS PROGRAMS 
Thus, what makes exploring solutions to the cyber security CI threat 
worthy of premium policy prioritization in a world full of threats? Recent research 
by the Unisys Corporation revealed distressing cyber vulnerability within the 
world’s CIs. Their 2014 survey quizzed “599 security executives at utility, oil, gas, 
energy and manufacturing companies” and found that 70% reported “at least one 
cyber security breach” resulting in the loss of proprietary data or the “disruption of 
operations” within the preceding twelve months.366 They were also questioned as 
to their opinions on the probability that their institutions would sustain an ICS 
cyber attack, and “78% responded that a successful attack is at least somewhat 
likely within the next 24 months.”367 Finally, “64% of respondents anticipated one 
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or more serious attack(s) within the next year” but “only 28% ranked security as 
one of the top five strategic priorities for their organizations.”368 
This CI vulnerability is coupled to what many believe is a new cyber arms 
race. In the past, joining other nations with nuclear weapons capability has 
always been an expensive and technologically difficult undertaking for aspiring 
nations. However, developing and fielding a cyber weapons arsenal is much less 
expensive and easier to accomplish. According to a Wall Street Journal 
compilation of government records and interviews, at least 29 countries have 
formalized intelligence or military units dedicated to offensive cyber 
operations.369 In recognition of the growing cyber threat, the U.S. Cyber 
Command currently fields nine “national mission teams” and plans to add four 
more.370 According to a Pentagon spokesperson, the mission teams will, 
“Conduct full spectrum cyberspace operations to provide cyber options to senior 
policy makers in response to attacks against our nation.”371 Cyberspace is an 
expanding frontier for military and intelligence operations that will continue to 
evolve as fast as technology does.  
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this thesis is to identify the pivotal areas of U.S. policy 
that could be enhanced to provide the most effective overarching solutions to the 
current vulnerabilities highlighted within this document, and then provide 
recommendations for the improvement of these key areas. The three key areas 
in need of policy enhancement to bolster the national CI and ICS defenses 
include enhancing national unity of effort, expansion of cyber security 
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coordination between the private and government sectors, and incentivizing 
private sector compliance with best practices in cyber security.  
1. Enhancing National Unity of Effort 
Achieving national unity of effort is a crucial and fundamental objective of 
national CI cyber security policy due to the diverse stakeholder pool responsible 
for national CI cyber security, and the far-reaching societal effects of a successful 
cyber attack on CIs. Securing cyberspace, and the computer networked CIs that 
interact within it, has become a national policy priority for the U.S. government. 
However, defining U.S. policy, as it pertains to CI cyber protection, is made 
difficult due to the overlapping nature of the various documents, which make up 
the policy. The policy must be distilled from continually evolving documents, such 
as legislation, commission reports, presidential decision directives, EOs and 
official federal plans. Changes in presidential administrations have each triggered 
a cycle of restructuring, realigning, renaming, and refocusing of efforts and 
objectives.  
Although U.S. CI cybersecurity policy has evolved greatly over the past 
two decades, it is a complex interwoven fabric comprised of a variety of types of 
national policy documents. The policy has evolved from an initial focus on 
physical security to an intense focus on cybersecurity. The policy has evolved 
from baseline definitions and sector identifications all the way to the current 
National Cybersecurity Framework for CI Protection and the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan. Some national policies are classified documents 
authorizing cyber defenses that cannot be publicly detailed, and other policies 
are open source documents crafted with the inclusion of the public sector in 
mind. No single repository is available to which someone can refer, read, and 
understand U.S. cyber policy. In addition, no designated authority responsible for 
the overall mission of national cyber security and defense exists. 
Other nations have taken different policy approaches to national cyber 
security policy on CI protection. The Australian government published 
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complimentary documents in back to back years to focus private and government 
sector stakeholders within this mission space. In 2009, Attorney General Robert 
McClelland published the Australian national “Cyber Security Strategy” to 
synergize efforts on national objectives to protect the Australian government, and 
business and civilian sectors from cyber threats. The document also specifically 
addresses ICS security372 and CI cyber protection.373  
In 2010, Attorney General Robert McClelland published the complimentary 
Australian national “Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy,” which details an 
all hazards approach to national CI resiliency with an emphasis on cyber threats. 
The document outlines policy objectives within this mission space, with the 
Australian government’s “Trusted Information Sharing Network” (TISN) noted as 
a focal point for government and private sector collaboration.374 These two policy 
documents outline overarching frameworks Australians can utilize to understand 
the objectives, strategic priorities, and components of their national strategy. To 
achieve true national unity of effort in CI cyber security, a nation must first 
understand the strategic objectives to be accomplished in furtherance of that 
effort. These two documents provide that baseline understanding for Australians. 
Defining the current policy of the United Kingdom, as it pertains to cyber 
security, is also a much simpler task than defining the U.S. policy. The United 
Kingdom publishes it’s official policies under the “policies” tab of its official 
government website (https://www.gov.uk/government/policies).  
A national policy document outlining a five-year strategy was published on 
November 25, 2011, and is entitled, “The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting 
and Promoting the UK in a Digital World.” The policy is introduced with a “written 
ministerial statement” from Francis Maude, the Minister for the Cabinet Office 
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and Paymaster General. The statement notes that the U.K.’s National Security 
Strategy includes cybersecurity as one of the top tier national priorities and 
commits the equivalent of one billion U.S. dollars, over a five-year period, to 
develop the U.K. cyber response effort.375  
The comprehensive policy document contains an ambitious vision for the 
end of that five-year time frame, that the measures outlined in the policy will put 
the United Kingdom in a position in which “law enforcement is tackling cyber 
criminals; citizens know what to do to protect themselves; effective cyber security 
is seen as a positive for U.K. business; a thriving cyber security sector has been 
established; public services online are secure and resilient; and threats to our 
national infrastructure and national security have been confronted.”376  
The policy breaks down specific action items underneath these 
overarching policy objectives. The policy candidly acknowledges the impossibility 
of absolute network security, and therefore, embraces a risk-based approach of 
prioritized response.377 The ownership of most CI is recognized as privately 
owned, and the policy lays out the necessity for cooperation between individuals, 
the private sector, and the government. The policy pledges transparently and a 
commitment to report back on its progress.378  
The U.K. Cyber Security Strategy has kept its promise of accountability and 
transparency by issuing progress report updates in December of each 
successive year. Updates are published by the U.K. Cabinet Office, which is 
identified as being responsible for overall national cyber security. Progress is 
tracked according to the specific action items listed in the policy’s objectives. 
Impressive progress is noted in the December 2014 report, with many initiatives 
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noted as performing well above predicted thresholds. It is another example of a 
government policy that promotes national unity of effort. The U.K. approach of 
publishing annual progress reports measures progress toward its five-year policy 
objective benchmarks and spotlights annual focus on the topic of CI cyber 
security to keep it at the forefront of the national conscience.  
• Policy recommendation #1 is the creation of a new federal 
Department of Cyber Affairs, led by a presidential cabinet level 
Secretary of Cyber Affairs, and the subsequent assignment to the 
department of developing a unified cyber security policy for the 
United States.  
A definitive document outlining an official cyber protection policy for the 
United States would promote national unity of effort for the military, business, and 
private sectors of the country. Target benchmarks could be established for 
strategic objectives and an annual progress report could measure progress and 
keep the discourse on this critical topic relevant nationally each year. A unified 
policy would currently require collaboration by the DOD for military operations, 
the DHS for domestic operations, and the Department of Justice for criminal 
investigations. It would be a tall task merging these bifurcated missions into one 
policy without leadership from a designated government official responsible for 
the overall cyber security of the United States.  
Federal department heads are responsible for carrying out U.S. policy as 
directed by federal laws and presidential directives. Cyber security policy 
responsibility is currently diffused between several departments and does not 
have clear ownership. Comprehensive cyber security policy would be most 
effectively developed by a Department of Cyber Affairs, responsible specifically 
for that policy, with a Secretary who reported directly to the President as a 
member of his cabinet. This Secretary would in essence become the new focal 
point of cyber security for the nation and would be responsible for the 
development, coordination, and execution of overall cyber security policy to meet 
national objectives, such as protecting U.S. CIs. A definitive policy document 
outlining an official cyber security policy for the United States would promote 
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national unity of effort for the government, military, business, and private sectors. 
The newly appointed Secretary of Cyber Affairs would have implementation 
responsibility for the following two policy recommendations as well. 
2. Expansion of Cyber Security Coordination between the Private 
and Government Sectors  
Many of the activities that form the foundation of day-to-day life for 
American citizens and the government rely on potentially vulnerable networked 
computer systems. Networked computers are a critical component in most of the 
nation’s 16 CI sectors. It is true as it pertains to military defense, public safety 
service delivery, the delivery of electricity, the transportation of people and 
goods, the banking industry, the communications industry, and the delivery of 
clean water. Interruptions to these, or other critical services, could be either 
disruptive or devastating for the nation’s well-being and security.  
Accordingly, cyber security for national CI ranks among the highest 
national security priorities. However, as noted earlier, the majority of U.S. CI 
remains under private management and control. The private ownership piece 
makes unifying CI cybersecurity particularly challenging because owners and 
managers set their own business priorities and determine their own cyber 
security defense measures.  
Australia has chosen a consolidated cyber security approach that 
undertook its latest evolution in November 2014, with the opening of the 
Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC).379 The ACSC condenses national 
cyber security capabilities, from across the government spectrum, into one 
location that serves as a hub for private and public sector collaboration to counter 
serious cyber threats.380  
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Six key Australian government agencies are co-located in a special 
purpose, high security building in Canberra, Australia.381 All six partners provide 
expertise specific to their agencies to round out a protective posture for 
Australia’s cyber assets. The Australian Signals Directorate furnishes expertise in 
information security and offers advice to government agencies. The Cyber 
Emergency Response Team (CERT Australia) serves as the anchor point of 
contact for major Australian businesses. The Australian Federal Police respond 
to and investigate cyber crimes of national significance. The Australian Crime 
Commission uncovers, analyzes, and prioritizes cyber threat intelligence 
information to support response options. The Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization provides cyber investigators and telecommunication security 
specialists. Finally, the Defense Intelligence Organization contributes strategic 
intelligence analysts.382  
The United Kingdom took this concept of government agency 
collaboration a step further by establishing its Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Partnership (CISP) in March 2013. CISP provides a collaborative platform for 
companies to share real time cyber threat information. A fusion center hub, 
comprised of private and government sector cybersecurity experts, examines the 
data and distributes enhanced intelligence and mitigation advice to the CISP 
membership. As of December 2014, CISP had 750 member organizations 
participating in the program.383 
• Policy recommendation #2 is the consolidation of U.S. government 
cyber security expertise and assets for a more focused approach 
toward unified cyber defense for U.S. CIs.  
U.S. national cyber security could benefit from the experiences of the 
United Kingdom and Australia, as it pertains to the bringing together of both 
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government and private sector expertise and assets to benefit national CI cyber 
security defenses. This second recommendation would pair neatly with the first 
recommendation of this thesis, which was the publishing of a unified cyber 
security policy by a newly appointed Secretary of Cyber Affairs.  
Currently, U.S. CYBERCOM, U.S. military branches, U.S. intelligence 
agencies, the Department of Justice and the DHS field separately located cyber 
commands to focus in on their specific responsibilities pertaining to cyber 
security. These agencies could jointly house their experts under the umbrella of a 
new Department of Cyber Affairs to magnify the benefits of the expertise they 
have individually developed and reduce the potential for duplication of effort in a 
manner similar to the Australian Cyber Security Centre.  
Among the agencies to be included within this consolidation would be U.S. 
CERT, which already analyzes U.S. cyber threats and communicates related 
information with trusted public sector and worldwide partners. The role of U.S. 
CERT could be expanded to include a U.K. CISP style fusion center composed 
of both government agency representatives and CI cyber security experts from 
the private sector. The collective expertise of a co-located cyber security fusion 
center would strengthen the defense of all 16 CI sectors. An additional benefit 
would be further buy-in from and encouragement of the private sector to engage 
actively in the cyber defense of U.S. privately owned CIs.  
3. Incentivizing Private Sector Compliance with Best Practices in 
Cyber Security  
It does not matter whether the U.S. military, U.S. government or a private 
sector entity operates a CI computer system; they are all potentially vulnerable to 
cyber attacks. Mandating best practice compliance measures from military or 
government held CIs is fairly simple and straightforward. However, privately 
controlled CIs pose a special challenge. Such companies operate under a 
traditional business model in which operational decisions will be made based on 
which option provides the best outlook for increased profits. Compelling private 
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sector companies to improve cybersecurity may carry a substantial price tag that 
could affect their short- or long-term profits. Some organizations believe that 
since the United States has not suffered a prominent cyber disruption of control 
systems, spending the time and money to update security for ICS prematurely, 
even if currently viewed as vulnerable to cyber attacks, is not economically 
justifiable when their current systems were designed to have 20+ year 
lifespans.384  
Some potential solutions to coordinating the nation’s cyber defenses of 
U.S. CIs are viewed unfavorably. Mandating business compliance with strict 
cyber security standards is viewed by many within industry as over-regulative, 
profit draining, and even dis-incentivizing of innovation in cyber defense practices 
and products that could ultimately benefit all sectors. Another potential solution 
would be allowing USCYBERCOM increased authority and responsibility over 
private sector CI protection. While potentially justifiable due to the disruptive and 
devastating effects a CI cyber attack could have on national well-being and 
security, it is another potential solution with considerable downside. Some 
believe it would be overly intrusive, could begin the “militarization of cyberspace,” 
and could create distrust among cyber business and consumer markets.385 
Either of these mandated solutions would likely meet with stiff public sector 
resistance.  
The United Kingdom has adopted a unique approach to gaining voluntary 
cyber security best practice compliance from its business sector. The most 
interesting aspect of the program is that it incentivizes businesses to want to 
come into best practice compliance because it offers them a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace, which speaks directly to businesses in a language 
they fully understand. The United Kingdom implemented  its voluntary “Cyber 
Essentials” program in 2014 to reward cyber security best practices among 
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businesses. This government backed and industry supported program 
incentivizes widespread adoption of cyber security best practices that protect 
organizations against cyber attacks and gives them the ability to differentiate 
themselves in the marketplace for customers, investors, and business partners. 
Successful program certification of compliant businesses rewards them with a 
“badge” that firms can use to demonstrate their cyber security credentials 
publicly.386  
The program provides businesses with guidance on implementing 
essential security controls to secure their networks better from most common 
cyber threats. Companies can apply for two levels of “badges” based on the level 
of rigor they want or need to demonstrate. “Cyber Essentials” badging requires 
the completion of a self-assessment questionnaire independently reviewed by a 
certifying body. “Cyber Essentials Plus” requires actual systems testing by an 
external certifying body. Once earned, certification badges provide companies 
with a marketing credential certifying to customers, partners, or clients that their 
company takes cyber security seriously. It bolsters the company’s public 
reputation and provides a competitive selling point that can be leveraged in the 
marketplace.387  
The resulting dynamic of this program is the creation of a profit driven 
business incentive that encourages the adoption of cyber security best practices. 
It benefits the resilience of the business community, U.K. CIs and the nation as a 
whole. The U.K. government further incentivized the program by requiring 
government contracts to be awarded to companies that have completed badging 
certification.388 During the first six months of implementation, between June and 
December 2014, 124 companies were awarded the cyber essentials badge and 
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30,000 more had viewed the web summary documents signifying significant 
interest.389  
• Policy recommendation #3 is the development of a voluntary 
business cyber security certification program that allows 
businesses exhibiting cyber security best practices to be 
recognized in the marketplace for their commitment by customers, 
investors, and partners similar to the U.K.’s “Cyber Essentials” 
program.  
The ability to incentivize cyber security best practices for U.S. businesses 
and CIs, by having these organizations view such a program as a marketplace 
advantage, would be a powerful tool in gaining voluntary compliance. The 
objective would be to create a competitive atmosphere in which companies 
would want to earn their certifications to assure customers of their cyber security 
prowess, to outpace competitors who may be slow to adopt best practices, and 
to develop a reputation as a cyber trustworthy company among their business 
partners. 
The program could be structured in such a way as to feature tiered 
compliance levels of certification to address the differing needs of the business 
and CI community. The added incentive of requiring certification by companies 
seeking government contracts would further encourage many companies 
involved with securing CIs to make an effort to comply with best practices. 
Program development should take place as a shared venture with the business 
sector to ensure buy in and input from the ground level. The critical component of 
this program is ensuring it is something the business sector sees value in and 
wants to pursue for business reasons. This third policy recommendation could be 
implemented in conjunction with the first two recommendations and could fall 
under the purview of a newly created Department of Cyber Affairs. 
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E. CONCLUSION  
The objective of this thesis is to identify the pivotal areas of U.S. CI cyber 
protection policy that could be enhanced to provide the most effective 
overarching solutions to the current vulnerabilities highlighted by the Stuxnet 
attack on Iran, and provide subsequent recommendations for policy 
improvements. The three key areas in need of policy enhancement to bolster 
U.S. national CI and ICS defenses were identified as enhancing national unity of 
effort, expansion of coordination of effort between the private and government 
sectors, and incentivizing private sector compliance with best practices in cyber 
security.  
The three overarching policy recommendations were identified as the 
following. 
• The creation of a new federal Department of Cyber Affairs, led by a 
presidential cabinet level Secretary of Cyber Affairs, and the 
subsequent assignment to the department of developing a unified 
cyber security policy for the United States.  
• The consolidation of U.S. government cyber security expertise and 
assets for a more focused approach toward unified cyber defense 
for U.S. CIs. 
• The development of a voluntary business cyber security 
certification program that allows businesses exhibiting cyber 
security best practices to be recognized in the marketplace for their 
commitment by customers, investors and partners similar to the 
U.K.’s “Cyber Essentials” program.  
These recommendations could be combined together as programs 
managed under a new federal Department of Cyber Affairs. They could 
potentially be implemented independently and managed by separate government 
entities that could be assigned responsibility for the initiatives. The downside to 
that approach would be the continued fragmentation of cyber security 
responsibility among stakeholders within the United States when unity of effort 
should be the key to this diverse landscape of military, government, business, 
and private sectors owners of U.S. CI.  
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The question then remains how will these policy recommendations 
prevent the United States from becoming the next victim nation of a Stuxnet style 
cyber attack? Three critical points of failure at Natanz enabled the attack. The 
critical points include system access, system security, and policy. These three 
crucial points all contributed to the failures that allowed Stuxnet to infiltrate, thrive 
within, and destroy centrifuges at Natanz.  
The first point of failure at Natanz, leading to the Stuxnet infection, was the 
insider threat of system access at the facility. Stuxnet was engineered to be hand 
carried into the Natanz plant to infect the computer network. Symantec experts 
believe, “this may have occurred by infecting a willing or unknowing third party, 
such as a contractor who perhaps had access to the facility, or an insider.”390 
The fact remains that negligent insiders spawn potential network access portals 
for malicious outsiders and incubate potential vulnerability for CIs in the United 
States.  
The second point of failure at Natanz was the spread of Stuxnet through 
an air-gapped network to the PLCs, which controlled the precise spinning speed 
needed for proper centrifuge operations. Isolated and air gapped systems, such 
as the one at Natanz, have limited options when it comes to moving data 
between physically separated network computer systems.391 Stuxnet was 
programmed to copy itself onto inserted removable drives, each time one was 
used, as one of its primary propagation methods. Thus, each time an infected 
removable drive was used to move data or instructions from one computer to 
another, the Stuxnet worm was also implanted.  
These first two points of failure, system access and system security, fall 
into line with the third point of failure, which is policy. Although the Iranian 
government will not publicly share its Natanz policy portfolio, a deficiency exists 
in either establishing or following appropriate security protocols that led to the 
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system access and system security breakdowns noted as the first two points of 
failure. Policy recommendations are the focus of the conclusion of this thesis. 
The unfortunate reality is that no fail-safe set of countermeasures or 
policies is available that will provide complete immunity from CI cyber attacks. 
Cyber threats are evolving at a faster rate than the countermeasures employed 
to prevent them. Therefore, policy approaches must be vulnerability-based rather 
than threat-based. By focusing on reducing vulnerability, exposure is narrowed to 
all potential cyber threat vectors.392  
The exposed Natanz vulnerabilities of the insider access threat, the 
transfer of data within a closed CI computer system on removable drives, and the 
policies supporting these functions, can all be addressed. Policy and procedure 
related to insider access can be effectively written, communicated, and enforced 
to limit system and sensitive data access to the smallest number of authorized 
users possible.393 The objective is to restrict access as tightly as possible, while 
still allowing for efficient business operations, to narrow the insider threat vector 
as much as possible. 
Stuxnet’s propagation through the Natanz computer systems could also 
have been affected from a technology security policy standpoint. Policy 
restrictions on the use of portable media and drives, along with the encryption of 
sensitive system data, could have greatly reduced the vulnerability at Natanz had 
such restrictions been followed.394 Data could still be securely moved through 
air-gapped CI systems like Natanz on removable storage drives with specific 
removable drive security software backed up by policies specifying which devices 
can be used and by whom. These are just the known vulnerabilities exposed by 
the Stuxnet attack. Other vulnerabilities may have been present but were not 
exploited. 
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Mandating policy reform can be one approach that would be effective 
perhaps for military or government controlled CIs. Policies and procedures can 
be published and enforced within these environments. Violations can be 
uncovered during audits and corrective measures can be administered when 
non-compliance is found. However, with most of the U.S. CI network falling under 
the control of private business, mandating policy measures for procedures or 
security upgrades is a challenge. Currently, no mechanism exists for mandating 
security procedures for most of the business sector. 
The recommendations of this thesis start with unification of effort under a 
single national policy on cyber protection for U.S. CIs through a new federal 
department charged with cyber security for the nation. Under the umbrella of this 
new policy and department, a consolidation of currently fragmented cyber 
security expertise could occur so the nation’s best and brightest minds in this 
field could work together jointly, regardless of agency assignment, to develop the 
most innovative cyber security solutions to the nation’s most daunting threats. A 
voluntary but incentivized cyber security certification and credentialing program 
could be developed in partnership with business sector stakeholders. The 
objective would be to create a competitive atmosphere in which companies 
would want to earn cyber security certifications to assure customers of their 
cyber security prowess, to outpace competitors who may be slow to adopt best 
practices and to develop reputations as cyber trustworthy companies among 
business partners. 
F. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
An important implication of the Stuxnet attack, but one outside the scope 
of this thesis, focuses on the education and skill sets of the people employed to 
protect U.S. CIs from cyber attacks. Rapid technical innovations and 
advancements in computer technology within U.S. CIs require the services of an 
increasingly technologically astute workforce. U.S. educational institutions are 
struggling to meet the growing demand for cyber security professionals in the 
 104 
workforce, which has resulted in a gap that has left many cyber security jobs 
unfilled.395 Questions for future consideration include the following.  
• Are U.S. primary education system’s curricula sufficiently educating 
children in the cornerstone cyber security educational fields of 
STEM to make them successful at the university level? 
• Is the U.S. secondary education system appropriately postured, 
with the right programs at its universities, to educate the talent 
needed to fill jobs within the domestic cyber security workforce? 
• Do non-traditional fields or vocations exist from which cyber 
security talent should be recruited? 
• Are adequate internships and professional development programs 
available within the cyber security professional field of the United 
States to advance and train new employees entering the 
workforce?  
The U.S. capacity to maintain it’s standing as a technology innovator is 
key to its ability to protect U.S. CIs and their computerized ICS from future 
attacks. Education is and always will be the key to building a solid foundation for 
U.S. cyber defenses. Enough ground can be covered, and enough questions 
answered, on the educational side of cyber defense to satisfy several theses. 
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